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Abstract
For over 40 years, lawmakers and academics have been
debating whether the United States should adopt a meritor skills-based approach to labor immigration and a
points-based program for selecting foreign workers.
Despite having bipartisan support, efforts to adopt such a
program thus far have been unsuccessful.

here in the United States. Lessons from the former led the
authors to embrace a two-stage selection process and
criteria designed to balance both the short- and long-term
needs of the U.S. economy. Lessons from the latter led
the authors to adopt a more targeted and incremental
approach to immigration reform, resulting in a policy
proposal that is modest in its size, scope, strategy, and
structure.

This idea is now back at the center of public debate,
having been given new life by President Trump. He has
called for “merit-based” immigration reforms that would
make the United States more effective at attracting the
world’s “best and brightest” and make it more
competitive in the global marketplace for highly skilled
foreign workers. The President’s public embrace of this
goal has not been accompanied, however, by any detailed
policy proposal or administration-backed bill introduced
in Congress.

The points-tested visa program laid out in this proposal
would be temporary by design, initially authorized for just
ten years, and would increase the number of green cards
issued each year by only 4%. This program is designed to
supplement, not displace, existing employment-related
and family-based immigration categories. As such, this
proposal does not call for any changes to existing
immigration categories. Finally, the proposal embraces a
piecemeal and incremental approach to legislative
strategy, recommending that the pilot program be
introduced in Congress as a standalone bill rather than as
part of a comprehensive immigration reform package.

This report capitalizes on this atmosphere of renewed
interest by harnessing the current administration’s
enthusiasm, providing evidence-based policy guidance,
and mapping out a path forward that avoids the policy
gridlock and political pitfalls that have beset past efforts
to implement a points-based immigration program in the
United States.

For all these reasons, the authors believe that the policy
recommendations presented in this report are legislatively
achievable and would be programmatically successful.

This path forward is presented in the form of a legislative
program. The authors recommend that the U.S. create a
small pilot program that would allocate 50,000 green
cards each year to candidates selected through a novel
points-based selection program. Alongside this small
pilot, the authors recommend creating a number of
administrative supports meant to ensure that this program
is effective, flexible, and transparent. Included are
guidelines and financial support for U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) or another executive
agency to gather linked long-term data on the
employment outcomes of admitted foreign workers;
provisions requiring periodic review of the program by
relevant congressional committees; and the establishment
of a standing advisory board consisting of immigration
experts and stakeholders.
In designing these proposals, the authors sought to
incorporate lessons from both the successes enjoyed by
those countries that have already implemented points
programs and the failures endured by those involved in
past efforts toward comprehensive immigration reform
1
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Chapter 1:
Introduction/Executive Summary
“[I]nstead of admitting people through random
chance, we will establish simple, universal criteria for
admission to the United States. No matter where in
the world you’re born, no matter who your relatives
are, if you want to become an American citizen, it
will be clear exactly what standard we ask you to
achieve. … Like Canada and so many other modern
countries, we create an easy-to-navigate points-based
selection system.” President Donald Trump, May
16, 2019.1

implemented,9 and no administration-backed bill has been
introduced in Congress.
The atmosphere of renewed interest combined with a lack
of details has opened a space for a new round of debate
over whether and how the United States might adopt an
immigration points program. The contemporary
atmosphere of political gridlock and the lack of success so
far might encourage participants to find new approaches
to this idea.

This report aims to do just that, drawing on past lessons
and existing innovations while adding something new.

U.S. academics, policy experts, and lawmakers have been
proposing “merit-based,” “skills-based,” or “pointsbased” employment-based immigration systems since the
late 1970s.2 Since then, several bills have been introduced
in Congress proposing such a system,3 three of which
have come within striking distance of passing.4 So far,
however, advocates and supporters have failed to enact
such an immigration selection system in the United
States.

Specifically, our proposal calls for:
• The enactment, as a 10-year pilot program, of a new
green card stream in which applicants are evaluated
according to a points rubric.
• Allocating to this pilot program 50,000 permanent
visas per year, without changing other current
immigration categories.

The idea of a points-based immigration selection system
is once again at the center of public debate, largely
because of statements by President Trump and members
of his administration. Since before he took office,
President Trump has made his support for a “merit-based”
immigration system a core element of his immigration
platform.5 Indeed, this policy goal has been featured in
many of the President’s most high-profile formal remarks
on immigration, from his first address to Congress in
20176 to a 2019 Rose Garden speech on the
administration’s immigration priorities.7 In the latter set
of remarks, President Trump called for the adoption of an
employment-based immigration system in which
“immigrants are selected based on skill or based on merit”
and in which applicants would receive “points for being a
younger worker,… for having a valuable skill, an offer of
employment, an advanced education, or a plan to create
jobs.”8

• A single application stream, managed through an
“expression of interest” application system like Canada
and Australia.
• A points rubric weighted toward longer-term human
capital factors such as educational attainment, age,
experience, teamwork, and linguistic abilities. We
already have the existing labor certification system for
short-term labor needs. We would not change that.
Rather, our proposed program would focus instead on
long-term human capital needs in the United States.
• An oversight apparatus capable of gathering detailed
immigration data, keeping track of immigration
outcomes through large-scale longitudinal studies.
• A regular policy review process under which current
admission policies and post-entry integration and
support policies would be examined using (a) current
labor market data and future labor market projections
and (b) economic and societal integration outcome data
regarding past years’ immigration cohorts.

Even as the President and his administration have
consistently expressed support for merit-based (or pointsor skills-based) immigration, however, this advocacy has
yet to advance beyond high-level talking points. The
White House has not stated how such a system would be
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• A standing advisory board consisting of experts,
policymakers, and stakeholders, including policy
experts in economics, public policy, and immigration;
civil servants with experience in administering the
United States’ and/or other countries’ immigration
systems; and representatives from professional
associations, labor unions, and industry trade
associations.

system itself. Presented as part of a sweeping
restructuring of U.S. employment-based immigration and
contained within omnibus immigration bills that would
have imposed cuts on other immigration streams, past
efforts were either too costly to attract the support of
undecided lawmakers or too contentious to obtain the
support of vital groups.
Our proposal seeks to avoid these problems of scale. Its
incremental approach, narrow subject matter, and small
policy footprint combine to make our proposal a low-cost,
low-risk proposition for legislators. By lowering these
barriers to entry for undecided lawmakers and providing a
realistic path to adoption for lawmakers on both sides of
the aisle who have already expressed support for
employment-based immigration reform, our proposal
represents a viable way to achieve the goal of
implementing an immigration points program in the
United States.

In many ways, our proposal isn’t all that novel. Our points
rubric (the list of characteristics on which applicants are
evaluated and the relative point weights allocated to each)
resembles the points systems contained in past
immigration bills introduced in Congress. And the
application process and administration of our proposed
system is modeled on the efficient, flexible, and all-digital
systems now employed in Australia, Canada, and other
countries.
The novelty of our proposal lies in its intentional
modesty—in size, scope, strategy, and structure:

This goal—finding ways to pass legislation that aims to
reform and improve the United States’ employment-based
immigration system despite the current atmosphere of
gridlock and partisan polarization—is vitally important.
The United States’ current approach to skilled
immigration is broken. Rigid yearly caps and quotas on
permanent residents and certain classes of temporary
foreign workers severely limit the supply of visas and
talent, while demand continues to expand and the list of
qualified applicants grows. This dynamic, along with
increasingly stringent administrative requirements and
long processing times, has led to the formation of
backlogs lasting years (and even decades) for even the
most qualified applicants. Certain high-skilled Indian
nationals seeking an employment-related green card, for
example, currently must wait over a decade, as the State
Department is only now setting interview dates for such
individuals whose applications were filed in May 2009.10

• Size: Our proposed points-tested pilot program would
apply to only 50,000 green cards each year, about 4%
of overall yearly immigration to the United States.
• Scope: Our proposal does not call for making any
changes to existing immigration categories. Our
proposed pilot program is designed to supplement, not
displace, existing immigrant visa categories.
• Strategy: Our proposal recommends that Congress
enact this pilot program as a standalone bill, rather than
as part of a comprehensive immigration reform
package.
• Structure: Our proposal recommends creating this new
green card stream as a 10-year pilot program. Building
in this extendable expiration date reduces political
commitment costs for legislators, while also giving
enough time to generate reliable data to measure the
program’s impact.

These backlogs and delays impose unnecessary financial,
logistical, and psychological costs on prospective foreign
workers seeking to come to or remain in the United
States. These added costs have started to lead potential
would-be immigrants to go elsewhere,11 creating a “brain
drain” effect.

This four-squared modesty sets our proposal apart from
past efforts to establish a points system. Moreover, we
believe this modesty gives our proposal a chance to
succeed where others have failed.

These backlogs and delays also impose costs on U.S.
companies and workers. Access to skilled labor is a
critical determinant of success for start-up firms and small
and large businesses,12 many of which struggle to find
U.S. workers with needed skills. And while restrictions on

Our research suggests that the failure of past efforts to
implement an immigration points program in the United
States was due more to partisan overreach and legislative
ambition than to the specific provisions of the points
5

high-skilled immigration to the United States are often
cast as protections for U.S. workers, those restrictions
have not resulted in U.S. firms hiring more native
workers, but instead have led U.S. companies to move
certain jobs to more immigration-friendly countries like
Canada and Australia.13

net lifetime fiscal benefits of these skilled immigrants
would be between $589,000 and $1.03 million each.)
Additionally, highly skilled immigration has been found
to have profound and positive “scaling effects” on jobs
and wages for U.S. workers. According to a study by the
National Foundation for American Policy, every H-1B
worker hired by a U.S. firm creates 5 to 7.5 new domestic
jobs in that firm’s industry. 17 And according to a 2014
study, every 1% increase in foreign STEM (science,
technology, engineering, and math) workers leads to a 7
to 8% increase in U.S. workers’ wages.18

Taken together, these adverse effects pose a serious
problem to our nation’s fiscal, economic, and geopolitical
health and future. In encouraging talented individuals to
take their skills, creativity, productivity, and tax dollars to
other countries, the United States forgoes significant
economic, intellectual, and fiscal gains. In imposing
artificial challenges for U.S. businesses, the United States
is falling behind in the global race for talent. And, insofar
as the United States’ global standing depends in large part
on its role as a home for the most talented researchers,
inventors, innovators, and entrepreneurs, this is not only a
matter of geopolitical pride but also of national security.14

The benefits of skilled immigration are not limited to tech
firms and the large urban areas in which they tend to be
concentrated. Fostering skilled immigration can also
benefit communities in rural America.19 Such
communities face a number of challenges, including a
dire and growing shortage of physicians and other
healthcare workers. According to one recent report, rural
counties have on average fewer than half as many active
physicians per capita as urban counties, and 135 of these
counties don’t have a single active physician.20 This
shortage is already preventing many U.S. residents from
having reliable access to vital medical care, and it is likely
to get worse as rural doctors continue to retire faster than
they are replaced.21 Relaxing current restrictions on
skilled immigration could help to reverse these troubling
trends, because foreign-born doctors are more likely than
their U.S.-born counterparts to practice as primary care
providers22 and to be willing to live and work in poor or
rural communities.23

Stated simply, it is in the United States’ best interests to
adopt policies that foster high-skilled immigration.
As a general matter, immigrants generate far more
economic and fiscal benefits than costs. Indeed, according
to a 2017 study conducted by the National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, the average recent
immigrant will, over a lifetime, end up generating a
positive net fiscal impact of more than $279,000 (in 2012
dollars, an amount worth more than $312,000 today).
Stated another way, even if we subtract the total cost of
all government benefits this individual will likely receive
over a lifetime from the total amount of taxes this
individual will pay (including all taxes paid to local, state,
and federal governments) during their lifetime, an average
recent immigrant will end up generating around $300,000
in additional tax dollars paid.15

This report presents a set of policy and program
recommendations that we believe would be broadly
popular, legislatively achievable, and programmatically
successful. In the following pages, we provide an
introduction to points-based economic immigration
systems, the ways they are currently being employed in
Canada and Australia, best practices regarding their use
and implementation, and our proposal for a pilot program
in the United States.

In the same study, the National Academies found that
highly skilled immigrants—defined as those with
education beyond a bachelor’s degree—will likely each
generate between $523,000 and $915,000 in positive
fiscal value over their lifetimes.16 (These values were also
calculated in 2012 dollars. If adjusted to 2020 dollars, the

president-trump-modernizing-immigration-system-strongeramerica/.

Donald Trump, “Remarks by President Trump on Modernizing
Our Immigration System for a Stronger America” (Speech,
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Chapter 2:
Context, Concepts, and Definitions
Debates about immigration policy often are confusing and
politically charged. This is particularly true of discussions
about “merit-” or “skills-based” labor migration policies
and “points-based” selection systems. Obstacles like
specialized but often inconsistent terminology, fine
technical distinctions, and politicized connotations and
agendas all combine to make it difficult for well-meaning
people across the political spectrum to discuss these
public policy tools in an effective way.

their life, liberty, or health that has led them to leave their
prior country of residence. Each of these streams satisfies
a different government interest or policy goal. Familystream immigration promotes the state’s interest in
providing its nationals and permanent residents with the
chance to reunite with their family members and loved
ones, thus promoting societal stability.
Humanitarian-stream immigration serves the state’s
interest in acting as a humane member of the international
community and honoring international obligations and
agreements by offering refuge to those fleeing persecution
and violence. Economic-stream immigration serves the
state’s interests in promoting the health of its domestic
economy and job market by admitting migrants that have
the capacity to generate economic growth or fill gaps in
the labor market not addressed by native workers.

This chapter is designed to assist readers not already
familiar with these aspects of immigration policy. It
provides a brief introduction to the foundations of
immigration policy, defines and distinguishes relevant
terminology, and gives a brief overview of the history and
spread of merit-based immigration regimes and pointsbased selection systems.

Each of these state interests is important but distinct. So,
in addition to deciding what kinds of immigrants to
accept, countries must determine how many of each kind
of immigrant they want to accept. Or, put another way,
policymakers must decide what balance to strike among
these three immigration-related government interests, as
well as between these interests and the panoply of other
interests a state has.

§ 1 POLICY CONTEXT
The “Three Streams” of Immigration
Every country that accepts immigrants must decide what
kinds of immigrants it wants. Countries have tended to
focus on specific factors, such as: Is this potential
immigrant related or married to a citizen or resident of our
country? Would admitting a foreign worker adversely
affect native workers? Do we have a duty to admit people
fleeing persecution? These three questions correspond to
the three general types—or “streams”—of immigration
recognized by most countries today: family, economic,
and humanitarian.

Key Questions in Economic-Stream Immigration
Policy
In designing and governing economic-stream
immigration, policymakers face questions like: How
should foreign workers be selected, and who should select
them? What goals should economic-stream migration
policy pursue? And how should the state balance
competing goals, such as addressing near-term labor
market shortages versus ensuring the longer-term health
of the economy? What kinds of protections should be
built into our immigration system to make sure that
citizen or permanent resident workers are not being
unfairly disadvantaged, immigrant workers are not being
exploited, and economic migration programs are in fact
serving the economic (and political) interests of our
country?

These streams are distinguished according to the
differences in the criteria on which potential immigrants
are selected.1 Generally speaking, in the family stream,
potential immigrants are selected on the basis of having a
family member already residing in or originating from the
destination country. In the economic stream, potential
immigrants are selected on the basis of their potential to
contribute to the economic well-being of the destination
country or because no native workers are available for a
particular job. In the humanitarian stream, potential
immigrants are selected on the basis of a credible threat to
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Two Approaches to Selecting Economic-Stream
Immigrants: Demand- vs. Supply-Driven Models

prevailing labor market conditions but according to
criteria established by policymakers in advance. These
criteria, set by either statute or administrative regulation,
may include educational qualifications, work experience,
age, language skills, the existence of a job offer or
arranged employment,4 and previous wages. Because
selection decisions in supply-driven systems are made
according to criteria set by government officials
according to the needs of the economy or polity as a
whole, these systems tend to result in selection outcomes
that favor medium- and longer-term goals, such as
addressing foreseeable labor market imbalances or
accumulating human capital. Countries commonly
associated with this approach to selecting foreign workers
include Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.5

In the academic and policy literature, countries’ economic
immigration systems are often categorized according to
how they address the first of these underlying questions:
How should foreign workers be selected, and who should
select them? Broadly speaking, states use one of two
approaches in selecting foreign workers: a “demanddriven” approach or a “supply-driven” approach.2
Under a demand-driven approach, employers in a country
play the leading role in recruiting and selecting foreign
workers. (This is why these systems are also commonly
referred to as “employer-led” or “job-offer” systems.)
Countries employing this approach generally make
economic immigration contingent on having a job offer
from an employer within the destination country, a
requirement that effectively gives employers the ability to
set criteria for admission and to apply those criteria by
selecting which foreign workers’ applications can move
forward. Employers set the selection criteria by seeking
candidates who have the skills or qualifications to satisfy
their firm’s actual labor needs, enact their selections by
making job offers to the candidates of their choice, and
may initiate the immigration process by asking
immigration authorities to grant the foreign worker an
employment visa. Because selection decisions in a
demand-driven system are made by employers according
to their actual labor needs in real time, these systems tend
to result in selection outcomes that favor short-term
economic needs over longer-term goals. For the same
reason, they also tend to result in selection outcomes that
reflect the interests of the companies seeking to employ
foreign labor and not necessarily the broader interests of
the receiving state. States whose immigration policies and
programs have generally adopted a demand-driven
approach to labor immigration include Germany, Sweden,
Spain, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.3

This clean distinction between demand-driven and
supply-driven approaches is an artificially simplified
comparison of ideal types. It provides a useful lens
through which to compare the structure and effects of
labor immigration programs across states, but in reality all
states fall somewhere along a continuum between these
two extremes. Most countries that employ a supply-driven
(government-led) approach to labor immigration have
incorporated, to one degree or another, policy features
that make their immigration programs more responsive to
employer interests or labor market demand, whether by
granting expedited processing or bonus points to visa
applicants with a verified job offer or by limiting
admission to candidates whose profession is included on a
“shortage occupation list.”6 Similarly, no country has an
immigration system that is entirely employer-led. In these
countries, employers seeking to hire foreign workers must
do so according to regulatory parameters set by
government officials or national legislation. And in even
the most “demand-driven” systems, proof of an
employment offer is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for admission, as visa applications are often
subjected to various secondary requirements. Common
examples of these include minimum salary requirements
(meant to protect foreign workers and native workers
alike against wage suppression); labor market tests
assessing whether there are similarly qualified native
workers that could fill the position (meant to incentivize
the hiring of native workers); and minimum qualification
requirements (meant to ensure that foreign workers are
held to the same qualification standards as native
workers).

Under a supply-driven approach, government officials
and immigration agencies take the lead in recruiting and
selecting foreign workers. (This is why these systems are
also commonly referred to as “government-led” systems.)
In these systems, government immigration agencies
accept applications directly from prospective foreign
workers. These individuals’ applications for entry are then
assessed by immigration officers, not according to
10

§ 2 CORE CONCEPTS

“Merit-Based” or “Skills-Based” Immigration

Although the terms “merit-based immigration” and
“points-based selection” have been used frequently in
debates over immigration policy for decades, these terms
and the relationships between them are commonly
misunderstood by political figures and the general public
alike.

As technical policy terms, “merit-based immigration” and
“skills-based immigration” are both used to describe
economic-stream immigration programs in which: (a)
candidates’ applications for entry are evaluated according
to their skills, talents, training, and/or other measures of
“human capital” and “economic potential”;10 and (b) the
decision to select successful applicants is made by
someone other than a potential employer. These kinds of
programs are, therefore, one way of implementing a
supply-driven (government-led) approach to selecting
economic immigrants.

Some of this confusion is the result of disagreements
about terminology among academics and policy experts.
In some cases, different authors continue to use a variety
of terms to refer to more or less the same concept—as in
the case of “merit-based,” “skills-based,” “talent-based,”
and “knowledge-based” immigration. In others, different
authors use the same term to refer to different concepts,
such as the phrase, “two-step immigration systems,” a
description used by some scholars to refer to “Expression
of Interest” application management systems7 (discussed
below) and by others to refer to provisional-to-permanent
visa pathways.8 That said, these disagreements about
technical terminology are not unusual in a subject of
much debate that crosses so many national, political,
ideological, and disciplinary lines. And while such
apparent discrepancies may frustrate a casual reader, they
are not enough to prevent experts from understanding
each other.

Although the terms “merit-based” and “skills-based” have
slightly different connotations, these two terms—and the
less common “talent-based”11 and “knowledge-based”12—
are used more or less interchangeably in both popular and
academic discussions of immigration policy. That said,
although it is common for policy experts to treat “pointsbased immigration” as synonymous with “merit-based
immigration,” 13 strictly speaking this is incorrect. While
many “merit-based” immigration programs employ
“points-based” selection systems, this association is not
universal. Some countries, such as the United Kingdom,
Japan, and South Korea, have employed points tests as
secondary requirements in otherwise employer-driven
immigration programs. And others, such as Canada
between 1962 and 1967, have implemented merit-based
economic visa programs that did not use a points test to
select candidates.

A greater share of the confusion is the result of these
terms having become political buzzwords, taking on a
second layer of meaning. Previously only used in their
technical sense by immigration policy experts, terms like
“merit-based immigration” and “points system” have
started to be used by political figures and commentators
as rhetorical shorthand and political shibboleths used to
signal loyalty to a larger set of ideological commitments
and policy preferences.9 This rhetorical and political
adoption of these terms results, for example, in phrases
like “merit-based immigration reform” containing two
layers of meaning: one referring to a change in how
economic immigration policy and programs are run, and
the other referring to a shift in the balance between the
family and economic immigration streams.

“Points-Based” or “Points-Tested” Immigration
and Selection Systems
Points-based selection systems (also commonly referred
to as points-based immigration systems, points-tested
systems, or simply points systems) are a policy tool
through which lawmakers can implement an immigration
policy or program. Traditionally, points-based systems
have been used to assess prospective foreign workers’
applications to enter a host country on a work visa. In this
context, eligibility decisions are made in whole or in part
according to whether a given candidate is able to score
above a threshold number of points in a scoring system
that measures factors such as education level, connection
with the country, language fluency, and arranged
employment.

The following section aims to undo some of the effects of
this politicized rhetoric by providing clear technical
definitions of these and other key terms.

11

Points-based selection systems are largely policy neutral.
They are simply a policy tool by which policymakers can
ensure that applications for a given visa program are
assessed consistently, and that each application is
assessed according to multiple variously weighted
criteria.14

columns corresponding to the names of criteria, possible
point values, and scoring guidance.

“Skilled” or “High-Skilled” Immigration
There is no single, agreed-upon definition of skilled or
highly-skilled persons or occupations employed across
countries and among scholars. There are a variety of
approaches to defining this term, all of which employ one
or more of the following three characteristics:
education/training, occupation, and salary.

Although points-based selection programs have mostly
been used in economic immigration systems, they could
just as easily be used as a means to quantify the
application of other kinds of selection criteria. For
example, a points-based selection mechanism could be
employed in a family-stream migration system.15 A
policymaker might include “degree of relation to
sponsoring relative” as a selection criteria, and this could
be quantified by assigning potential point values to the
various familial relationships that might exist between the
applicant and a given family member residing in the
target state (e.g., parent, child, sibling, cousin).

Academics tend to define high-skilled migration
sparingly, using only one or two of these factors. This
trend toward parsimony is perhaps the result of an effort
to make these definitions more suitable to broad-scale
quantitative analyses. Some researchers define skill solely
according to the level of education a given migrant has
acquired,18 while others define “skill” according to the
occupation a given migrant has or will work in.19 Other
studies have employed slightly more complicated
approaches, defining skill according to the occupation and
the salary a given migrant has earned. However, this
approach has not been as widely adopted.20

While their specifics may vary, every points system
shares one characteristic: their selection criteria and the
relative weight of each factor are quantified, with each
criterion being assigned a maximum possible point value.
These criteria and point values are set in advance and
made available to immigration officers, the public, and
aspiring immigrants. Along with the criteria and
maximum point values, states generally also include
guidelines on how the points within each criterion will be
assigned to any given applicant. For binary criteria—e.g.,
the existence of a job offer—these guidelines are simple,
directing immigration officers to grant the full number of
points allocated to that criterion to any applicant
satisfying its conditions and no points to applicants who
do not. Most criteria, however, are non-binary, and thus
the guidelines for scoring these criteria lay out the varying
levels of “partial credit” that can be allocated under these
categories. In a scoring system in which the criterion of
education has 10 possible points, the scoring guidelines
might direct immigration officials to grant 10 points to
candidates who hold a doctoral degree, 8 points to those
holding a master’s degree, and 5 points to those with any
undergraduate postsecondary degree. These scoring
system details—the criteria, point values, and scoring
guidelines—may be communicated in plain prose or
formatted as a points table (also referred to as a “points
grid”16 or “rubric”17), a two-dimensional table with

Most receiving states tend to adopt approaches that
examine more than one of these approaches. For example,
Australia and Canada classify certain immigrants (and
immigration streams) as “skilled” on the basis of at least
three of the following four characteristics: the skill level
required by the immigrant’s occupation, the amount and
type of work experience they have already accrued, their
level of education, and their language skills.

The current U.S. immigration system does not employ
this kind of skilled/unskilled distinction. The closest
analog employed in the United States is the idea of a
“specialty occupation” employed in the current H-1B
temporary visa program, defined as an occupation
requiring at least a four-year degree. In the interest of
continuity and ease of implementation, our proposed
program would adopt this definition.

“Human Capital”
The term “human capital” is something of a shibboleth
among immigration policymakers and scholars, a term of
art that acts as a shorthand for many of the gains that
skilled immigration promises.21 Despite its centrality to
arguments both for and against skilled immigration,
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however, lawmakers and experts making these arguments
have yet to agree on a definition of the term.22

generally hold that persistent economic growth is not
possible without the accumulation of human capital.26
This is because it is only through the efforts, abilities, and
ideas of the individuals that make up a country’s “stock”
of human capital that new ideas and technological
advancements can be generated.27 As such, immigration
policies that select for human capital are thought to be
advantageous because those immigrants with higher
levels of education and experience can contribute needed
skills and expertise and are better able to adjust to both
cyclical and structural changes in the labor market than
those with lower levels of education.28

The concept of human capital emerged from the field of
economics in the mid-twentieth century in the work of
scholars like Gary S. Becker and Theodor W. Schultz.
These early works examined the impact on future incomes
that can be expected from schooling and other forms of
training.23 Given this goal, these economists defined the
concept of “human capital” simply as the set of skills that
individuals may acquire as a result of investments of time
and resources in education or training.24
In the intervening decades, this concept spread beyond
economics. As it spread, arguments arose over the precise
boundaries of this term. What kinds of skills should be
understood as human capital, and which should not? To
what degree are an individual’s future earnings dictated
by learned skills as opposed to innate abilities? What
kinds of education or training should count? And how can
we measure this form of capital, which is neither
transferrable nor tangible?

§ 3 HISTORICAL CONTEXT
With this theoretical context laid out and relevant terms
defined, we now turn to how policymakers have actually
implemented points systems over the past half century.

Origin and Proliferation
In 1967, Canada implemented the world’s first pointsbased selection system as part of an effort to attract larger
numbers of skilled foreign workers to meet the growing
needs of its domestic labor market. This policy tool has
since spread to more than a dozen other countries.

In the last two decades, as economists and policymakers
have sought better explanations of differences in
productivity and development across countries, there has
been a renewed interest in developing useful and
quantifiable measures of human capital.25

The first states to follow Canada’s lead were Australia
and New Zealand, with the former adopting a points
system in 1972 and the latter in 1991. This proliferation
accelerated in the early 2000s as countries across Asia
and Europe reformed and updated their labor immigration
systems. In Europe, the United Kingdom and the Czech
Republic were the first to implement points systems in
2002 and 2003, respectively,29 followed by Denmark in
2007,30 the Netherlands in 2008,31 and Austria in 2011.32
In Asia, Singapore was the first to adopt a points system
in 2004,33 followed by China34 and Hong Kong35 in 2006,
Malaysia in 2010,36 Japan in 2012,37 and South Korea in
2017.38

The academic literature on skilled immigration uses the
term “human capital” to refer to the skills and knowledge
possessed by individual migrants or to immigration
policies or programs that select for these qualities. In this
latter context, it is used to describe a possible approach to
valuing or admitting skilled migrants, with the “human
capital model of immigration” generally set at one end of
a continuum and the “labor shortages model of
immigration” set at the other.
Under the labor shortages model, the value of skilled
immigration is determined by the needs of the labor
market. Skilled immigration is thus cast as a tool to be
used only to address specific and immediate labor
shortages in vital economic sectors.

In addition to these fully implemented points systems, a
number of countries have moved toward adopting a points
system. Mexico and Turkey, in 201239 and 2016,40
respectively, both passed legislation laying the
groundwork for immigration points systems that have not
yet been fully implemented, and Germany ran a pointsbased pilot program from 2016 to 2019 that admitted
foreign workers to the state of Baden-Württemberg.41

By contrast, under a human capital model, the value of
high-skilled migration is determined not in reference to
the labor market but rather in reference to the needs of the
larger economy, often specifically focusing on economic
growth. Analyses emphasizing the human capital model
13

Evolution and Adaptation

from this original model, opting for different policy
choices in one or more ways.

As this historical progression shows, the number of
countries employing points-based selection systems is
growing at an increasing rate. That said, the points
systems in these states are by no means identical. Indeed,
as the number of such systems has grown and existing
points systems have become more established, these
systems have become increasingly diverse in their
structure, details, and application.

Single, High-Skilled Visa Stream
The historical association between points systems and
skilled immigration still exists. Most points-based
immigration selection systems are used in high-skilled
immigration programs. These include Canada’s Federal
Skilled Worker program, Australia’s three points-tested
skilled visas, New Zealand’s Skilled Migrant Category
program, Austria’s Red-White-Red Card program,
Japan’s Preferential Treatment for Highly Skilled Foreign
Professionals program, Turkey’s Turquoise Card
program, and the “Category A” stream of China’s
Foreigner’s Work Permit program.48

The following section addresses the commonalities and
variations among the points systems employed in various
countries. First, it describes what legal and policy scholars
have generally regarded as the “traditional” or “classic”
form of the points system. Next it discusses how existing
points systems have diverged from this “traditional”
model across a number of policy dimensions. Finally, it
summarizes some of the explanations given for why the
spread of points-based immigration selection systems and
other similar policy innovations have resulted not in
convergence but in a set of variations on a common
theme.

That said, various states have created points-tested
programs tailored to workers at lower skill levels. For
example, Canada has one skilled visa program dedicated
entirely to medium-skilled foreign workers (the Federal
Skilled Trades program), one that admits both mediumand high-skilled workers (the Canadian Experience Class
program), and a number of provincial-level programs that
admit either medium- or low-skilled workers. 49 Similarly,
medium-skilled workers whose occupation is included on
Australia’s Shortage Occupation List are eligible to apply
to any of that country’s three points-tested skilled visa
programs (subclasses 189, 190, and 489). Those
applicants are granted points for post-secondary
professional qualifications that are not university
degrees.50 Germany’s pilot points-tested program, the
Punktebasiertes Modellprojekts für ausländische
Fachkräfte (PuMa) (Points-Based Model Project for
Foreign Professionals), was aimed at medium-skilled
workers.51 And South Korea has a points-tested visa
stream, the Employment Permit System (EPS), that is
exclusively aimed at low-skilled foreign workers.52

The “Traditional” or “Classic” Points System
The points systems introduced in Canada in 1967 and
Australia in 1972 are often used as a baseline, providing
the template for what is commonly referred as the
“classic”42 or “traditional”43 model. This type of points
system is generally characterized as a policy tool that is
used to manage a single visa stream for high-skilled
foreign workers44 through which qualified applicants
apply directly for a permanent residence visa.45 This
points system is employed early in the application review
process, serving as a pre-entry screening mechanism that
helps to determine whether a given applicant is eligible
for entry. Under such a system, applicants are not
required to have arranged employment or a sponsoring
employer,46 and admissions decisions are administered
through a first-come, first-served single-step selection
process.47

Other states have employed points systems in economic
visa programs that do not include an explicit reference to
applicants’ skill levels or the skill levels of their
professions. These points-tested but not skills-based visa
programs have tended to be aimed at investors, selfemployed business owners, entrepreneurs, and start-ups.
Examples include Australia’s Business Innovation and
Investment (Provisional) Visa (Subclass 188),53 Canada’s
Immigrant Investor Program (IIP),54 New Zealand’s
Investor 2 Category Resident Visa55 and Entrepreneur

Variations on the “Traditional” or “Classic” Model
Many of the points systems implemented in countries
other than Canada and Australia, and the later iterations of
Canada’s and Australia’s points systems, share many of
these policy features. Many, however, have also diverged
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Work Visa programs,56 the Netherlands’ Investment Visa
Program,57 and South Korea’s D-8-4 (Start-Up Visa)
program.58

Australian policy toward a “two-step”61 approach to
immigration in which foreign workers seeking permanent
residence must first hold a temporary or provisional visa.
New Zealand has also begun experimenting with pointstested temporary visa programs. While it allocates
permanent visas in both its Skilled Migrant and Investor
visa programs,62 its more recently established
Entrepreneur Work visa program grants only a temporary
three-year visa.63 Austria’s RWR Card program has
multiple tiers, one that grants a six-month job-search
visa,64 another that grants a one-year temporary visa
(colloquially called an RWR Card), 65 and one that grants
a permanent residence and work permit (called an RWRPlus Card).66

There has been a similar proliferation of policy options
concerning the number of visa streams that any given
points system is used to manage. Some countries set up a
single overarching points system that applies to multiple
visa streams. Other states set up multiple points systems,
each linked to (and thus tailored to) a single visa program.
Some states adopt a mix of these approaches.
Policymakers in Canada and Australia have opted for the
former approach. Both countries have set out points
systems that apply to all their skilled-stream visa
programs. (Australia has now established a second points
system, and a second applicant pool, that is applied solely
in its “Investment 2” visa program.) Austria’s Red-WhiteRed (RWR) Card program adopts a similar approach,
using a single points system in the application process for
multiple kinds of residence permits, but diverges from the
Canadian and Australian approaches by varying the
number of points allocated to each factor depending on
the type of residence permit for which an applicant is
applying.59 Korea has four points-tested visa programs,
also called “status of residence” programs, each of which
employs a different points table.60

Other states like the Netherlands, Denmark, and
Singapore have limited their points systems to temporary
or provisional visas. The Netherlands’ only points-tested
visa program grants successful applicants a two-year
(renewable) visa.67 Denmark’s now-shuttered Green Card
program included two points-tested visa categories, both
of which were temporary: a six-month job-search visa68
and a three-year employment visa.69 Singapore’s only
points-tested visa program is the “S-Pass,” a temporary
visa that allows “semi-“ or “mid-level” skilled workers to
live and work in Singapore for two years.70
Three recent examples use points systems exclusively in
permanent visa programs. Hong Kong’s Quality Migrant
Admission Scheme, enacted as part of an effort to foster
skilled immigration, aims to attract talented foreign
workers by offering them permanent residence visas.71
Malaysia’s Residence Pass for Talent (RP-T) program
and Turkey’s Turquoise Card program also offer qualified
foreign workers a direct path to permanent residence.72

Allocating Permanent Visas
In the “classic” or “traditional” model, points systems
were used only in programs that allowed foreign workers
to directly apply for permanent resident status, without
requiring them to have held any provisional or temporary
visa beforehand. Canada continues to follow this practice,
directly allocating permanent residence visas in all its
points-tested programs.

Use as Eligibility Screening Mechanism

Most of the other countries that have implemented points
systems have moved away from this precedent. Some of
these states have continued to employ points systems in
programs that grant permanent visas but have also
implemented one or more points-tested temporary or
provisional visa programs. Australia, for example, has
continued to allocate permanent residence permits to
those admitted via its skilled independent visa program,
but the country also has a number of points-tested
temporary and provisional visa programs. Many of these
latter programs have been set up as part of a wider shift in

In the traditional model, an immigration points system is
used early in the visa application process to assess
whether applicants meet the eligibility requirements for a
given visa program, to sort a pool of applicants so that
immigration officers can select the most qualified
candidates, or both. This is still the most common way in
which points systems are used in the immigration regimes
of countries that have implemented one or more pointstested visa programs.
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Some countries, however, have found other uses for
points systems. For example, Japan and China have
incorporated points systems as a secondary sorting
mechanism in an otherwise largely employer-led labor
immigration regime. Foreign workers seeking to
immigrate to either of these countries must first obtain a
job offer before applying for a visa. It is at this stage that
these countries’ points systems are applied. Most foreign
workers seeking to enter Japan or China are routed
through these countries’ general, catch-all work visa
programs: the Z Visa in China and the Working Visa in
Japan. Highly qualified foreign applicants—those who
score over 70 points on Japan's Points-Based System for
Highly Skilled Foreign Professionals or more than 85
points on China’s Working Foreigners Classification
Scheme—may, however, be allowed to apply for alternate
visa programs that admit only highly skilled foreign
professionals. The visas issued through these alternate
visa routes—China’s R Visa and Japan’s Highly Skilled
Foreign Professional visa—grant foreign professionals all
the privileges associated with general work visas as well
as a range of additional privileges, including fewer
restrictions on the types of work permitted, visas for
spouses and children, visas for applicants’ parents or
household workers, preferential processing of subsequent
immigration applications, and faster access to permanent
residence.73 Thus, these two points systems differ from
those employed in more traditional models. Given that all
applicants who would be eligible for these high-skilled
visa programs would also be eligible for Japan’s or
China’s basic work visa, some authors have described
these two points systems as less akin to entry exams and
more to velvet ropes set at the entrance to the red carpet
(or “green path”) leading to a VIP room.74

fully paying for accident insurance, offering training for
their workers, and maintaining a safe work environment),
and “penalties” (a category that deducts points from
employers that have violated labor regulations in the past,
have had foreign workers quit due to sexual harassment or
physical/verbal abuse, or that are found to operate an
unsafe working environment).75 Under this system, all
employers’ applications are scored and then permits are
issued according to rank order until the program’s quota
is exhausted.76
Job Offer/Employer Sponsor Requirement
Under a traditional points system, applicants face few
mandatory requirements.77 Aside from meeting certain
minimum standards of health and character, such as
vaccination, lack of criminal record, or adequate means of
financial support, aspiring foreign workers may apply
regardless of whether they had arranged employment in
the destination state and without having to show evidence
of labor market demand for their particular professional
skills. That said, classic points systems did not ignore
these indicators of employability. They just included them
as criteria within the points table, rewarding applicants
whose professions were in particular demand and those
with arranged employment, but did not exclude applicants
who failed to meet those criteria.

A number of existing systems, however, have diverged
from this traditional model. Many points systems have
additional prerequisites that, if not satisfied, render a
prospective foreign worker ineligible to apply. Some of
these eligibility requirements may even address qualities
that are also addressed in the points system. These
include, for example, minimal levels of language
proficiency, being below a maximum age, earning above
a set minimum either in past salary or expected salary
upon entry, being qualified to work in a profession that
has been included on a government-compiled “shortage
occupation list,”78 passing a skills assessment,79 or having
a job offer in hand.80

Other states have even applied points systems to other
actors in the labor immigration process. Hong Kong,
Singapore, and South Korea have all set up points systems
by which they evaluate employers seeking to employ
foreign workers. Under Korea’s Employment Permit
System (EPS) program, a temporary visa program (E-9)
for low-skilled workers, employers’ applications to hire
foreign workers are scored according to a points test that
includes factors such as “basic items” (a category that
includes such measures as how many foreign workers an
employer has hired in the past and how many Korean
workers it hired in a given period), “bonus items” (a
category that rewards employers for doing things like

Single-Step Versus Expression of Interest Selection
Processes
In a classic points system, the process of evaluating
individual applications is relatively simple. Candidates
are assigned a given number of points for each criterion in
that program’s points table, these points are added up, and
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any applicant whose points total equals or exceeds a
specified “pass mark” is deemed eligible for a visa.81 In
this traditional “grading” procedure, individuals’
applications are evaluated according to an absolute82
assessment model under which their score totals are
assessed according to a fixed pass mark. This single-step,
threshold, or pass/fail83 assessment structure is used in
most points systems around the world, including those in
China, Denmark, Hong Kong, Japan, the Netherlands,
South Korea, Singapore, and Turkey.

iterations. In this, one could describe all these points
systems as exhibiting a kind of “family resemblance”—a
similarity marked less by universally shared
characteristics than by multiple overlapping similarities.85
This family resemblance is not the result of independent
invention but rather of imitation. Policymakers have
looked to existing points systems in other states for
inspiration. This phenomenon—in which policymakers or
jurists in one state look to policies, administrative
structures, institutions, or legal concepts in another state
as sources of guidance or templates to be imitated—is
referred to in public policy and political science as
“policy transfer”86 or “policy diffusion,”87 and in
comparative law as “legal borrowing” or “legal
transplantation.”88 Sources drawn from these subjects
offer numerous examples, drawn from various areas of
policy and law, suggesting that this process of crossborder circulation of policy innovations commonly results
in the kind of policy resonance among state policies that
can be observed here.

In the last two decades, however, an alternative approach
to applicant assessment has emerged. Under this new
model—referred to as an “expression of interest”
model—there is still a pass mark and applicants are still
assigned a total score based on a fixed points rubric.
Applicants whose total points meet or exceed the pass
mark are not, however, immediately deemed eligible to
receive a visa. These candidates’ applications are instead
placed in a “pool” of qualified candidates. All
applications in the pool are ranked according to the
number of points they have accrued. Immigration officials
(and potentially employers or regional governments) then
invite the highest scoring applicants to submit a full
application. This expression of interest assessment model
is thus a two-stage application process.84 Applicants are
first graded on an absolute basis according to a fixed
“pool pass mark.” They then are graded on a relative
basis, with their score totals being compared to those
earned by other applicants in the current applicant pool.

As addressed above in our definition of points systems, all
existing points systems share certain core characteristics:
they employ explicit selection criteria and quantify the
relative weight of each selection factor. In other words, a
points-based selection system is a policy tool that offers
policymakers a way to ensure that multiple, variously
weighted selection criteria will be consistently applied to
visa applications. In addition to this single universal
characteristic, however, a number of other characteristics
are shared by many existing points systems and their past

These same conceptual tools also account for the
differences among points systems, and for the apparent
increase in the variety of differences as the family of
points-system states has grown. In surveying the literature
on legal or policy borrowing, numerous reasons exist why
policymakers seeking to import a legal framework or
policy tool from abroad may not want, or be able, to do so
through simple duplication. First, different governments
have different policy goals, and different political
moments may require different strategies and
concessions. Each of these points systems was crafted by
political actors with their own political priorities, tailored
to address the concerns of a particular supporting
coalition, and framed in terms designed to resonate with a
specific public audience. Second, these foreign imports
may need to be “translated” to make them fit within the
policy context and legal culture of the borrowing state.
Third, there is an imperative to iterate and improve,
learning from and building upon the mistakes and
successes of other states employing the policy or legal
tool being imported.

This commonly used metaphor of three “immigration streams,”
distinguished from each other on the basis of the different kinds
of criteria used in each stream to separate admissible from

inadmissible migrants, helps to untangle the varied and quite
different reasons that governments might have for admitting a
given migrant. But regardless of what selection criteria are used,

Explanations for Spread and Variation
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Chapter 3:
Case Study—Canada’s Points-Based Immigration System
§ 1 THE EVOLUTION OF CANADA’S SKILLED
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM

guidelines, rationales and selection outcomes varied
among immigration officers.

Until the late 1950s, the underlying policy goal that
shaped Canada’s immigration policy was to entice large
numbers of new permanent residents that would help to
settle and to “civilize” its vast territorial holdings, while
also admitting only those potential immigrants that would
allow Canada’s national character to remain essentially
white-European.1 To this end, Canadian immigration
policy welcomed migration from Britain and northern
Europe while limiting or barring the entry of various
“classes” of nonwhite immigrants through the use of
explicit geographical and racial preferences.2

To solve this and other implementation problems,8 the
Canadian government issued a second set of regulations
in 1967,9 laying out a clear application review process and
an objective scale against which applicants would be
assessed.10 With this, Canada established the world’s first
points-based immigration selection system.
Under the first iteration of Canada’s points system,
immigration officials graded applicants according to a
rubric that established possible point values
corresponding to nine characteristics: (1) education and
training; (2) personal character; (3) occupational demand;
(4) occupational skill; (5) age; (6) pre-arranged
employment; (7) knowledge of French and English; (8)
the presence of a relative in Canada; and (9) employment
opportunities in their area of destination.11 Applicants’
scores in each of these categories were then added up,
resulting in an overall points total. Using these points
totals, admissions decisions were then made on a simple
pass/fail basis. Candidates who had earned a points total
that met or exceeded a set points threshold (or "pass
mark”) of 50 out of 100 points were deemed eligible to
receive a permanent residence visa.12

In the early 1960s, though, Canada faced intense domestic
and international pressure to drop these restrictions. At
home, Canada’s economy was booming and the domestic
labor market couldn’t supply sufficient skilled labor.
Abroad, Canadian officials supporting the wave of
decolonization sweeping through the United Nations and
the Anglophone Commonwealth faced criticism over the
tension between their antiracist rhetoric abroad and their
racially selective immigration laws at home. Spurred by
these dual political demands, Canadian officials began to
overhaul the nation’s immigration system, issuing
regulations in 19623 that directed immigration officials to
select candidates on the basis of “their education, training,
skills and adaptability,”4 irrespective of their race or
country of origin.

Each application was processed on a first-come, firstserved basis. This meant that each year, after targets for
how many permanent economic immigrants would be
admitted were set, immigration officials issued visas to
approved applicants one by one until that target was met.
Applicants whose points totals were sufficient for
admission but who were not immediately granted
admission because the yearly numerical targets had
already been met kept their place in line and had a legal
right to have their applications considered in future years
once their numbers came up.

This shift toward a more universal, economistic approach
to immigration proved popular among policymakers and
the public.5 But it soon became apparent that further
reform and guidance were needed. While the 1962
regulatory changes6 had included instructions for frontline
immigration officers, directing them assess visa
applicants based only on characteristics believed to
predict a candidate’s capacity to integrate in and
contribute to the Canadian economy (education, training,
skills, and “adaptability”), immigration officers were
given no clear guidelines on how to measure or weigh
these characteristics.7 Because officers retained such
broad discretion over the application of the prescribed

Over the intervening five decades, Canadian officials
have adjusted one or more of the parameters of this
original points system more than a dozen times.13 Some of
these adjustments were made in response to changes in
external circumstances, such as the 1982 addition of a job
offer requirement meant to restrict skilled immigration in
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and its “human capital” immigration model consistently
attracting the interest of high-skilled workers from around
the world, Canada began to receive record numbers of
applications for its skills-tested immigration programs.
Although it was not unusual for these visa programs to
have a backlog, this explosion of applications rapidly
“out-paced both the government’s desired level of intake
and the system’s operational capacity.”23 Faced with this
deluge of new applications, its fifty-year-old application
processing procedures couldn’t keep up, leading to the
development of a backlog of more than 600,000
applications with an average processing time of three to
five years.24

response to an economic downturn.14 Regulations issued
in 1986 removed that requirement to provide more skilled
immigrants to fill the needs of a now-revived economy.15
Some adjustments were made in response to perceived
malfunctions or unforeseen consequences of the policy
structure of the points system itself, such as in 1978 when
policymakers facing claims that the points system was
admitting too many “unemployable” but highly educated
candidates reweighted the points table, making it more
“labor-market relevant” by reducing the points granted for
education and increasing the points allocated to “labour
market factors” like work experience.16
Finally, the Canadian government made some
adjustments over the years in response to shifting policy
preferences and public opinion about whether pointstested skilled migration should be weighted toward
solving short-run labor shortages or building long-term
human capital reserves. In its original 1967 form, the
points system skewed strongly to the longer-term human
capital side of this continuum. In 1978, the pendulum
swung toward the other side of the continuum as
lawmakers reweighted the points table in favor of
“employability” factors, signaling a “clear shift toward
greater alignment with labor market needs.”17 A few years
later, the pendulum began to swing back, as lawmakers
once again adjusted the points table, increasing the points
allocated to education in 1986, in 1992, and again in
1995.18 This swing toward long-term “human capital”
culminated in 2001’s Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act (IRPA), an omnibus overhaul of Canada's
immigration law. The provisions of IRPA shifted
Canada’s skilled immigration programs almost entirely
away from the goal of meeting short-term labor market19
needs, casting them instead primarily as tools meant to
help Canada prepare for its longer-term future.20

After various attempts at minor fixes, in 2015 the
Canadian government fundamentally reformed its skillstested immigration systems. As part of this reform,
Canada replaced its single-test, first-come first-served
admission system with a new two-stage selection system
called “Express Entry”—an application management
program designed to be at once more effective and
efficient than its old system.

§ 2 CANADA’S CURRENT SKILLED
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM
Canada’s current skilled immigration system is made up
of three federal-level visa programs and various
provincial-level programs through which skilled
workers25 can receive permanent residence visas. The
application and selection process for all three of the
federal-level visa programs and most of the provinciallevel programs is administered through the Express Entry
application management system.

Canada’s Skilled Visa Programs

Across the first three decades of its existence, the points
system was remarkably responsive. Partly as a result of
the clearly defined policy levers offered by Canada’s
transparent and quantified points system,21 most of the
adjustments listed in the previous paragraphs did in fact
bring about changes in the rate and composition of
Canada’s skilled immigration flows that were in line with
the intentions of Canadian officials.22

Canada has three points-tested skilled visa programs at
the federal level. First, the Federal Skilled Worker
program is aimed at candidates that have the experience
and training needed to work in positions in the top three
skill levels of Canada’s National Occupation
Classification system: managerial jobs, professional jobs,
and technical jobs and skilled trades. The Federal Skilled
Worker program is the most common route for skilled
immigration into Canada. To be eligible for this program,
a candidate must: (1) have at least one year of experience
working in a relevant job; (2) demonstrate intermediate to

In the mid 2000s, however, the responsiveness and
flexibility of the points system started to break down.
With its economy in the midst of a years-long expansion,
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advanced fluency in English or French; and (3) have at
least a high school diploma or equivalent.

Canada also has a variety of visa programs that are jointly
administered by Canada’s federal government and the
governments of its various provinces and territories.
These Provincial Nominee Programs (PNPs) allow
participating provinces and territories to address local
labor market needs by selecting potential foreign workers
and/or foreign students and nominating them for
permanent residence visas.

Second, the Federal Skilled Trades program selects
candidates whose work experience and training qualify
them for certain technical jobs and skilled trades. To be
eligible for the Federal Skilled Trades program, a
candidate must: (1) have at least two years of full-time
work experience (or an equal amount of part-time work
experience) in one of the qualifying trades; (2) meet the
job requirements to work in their chosen trade; (3)
demonstrate a sufficient grasp of English or French to
work in their chosen trade; and (4) have either a valid
offer of full-time employment or have received a
“certificate of qualification” in their chosen trade from a
Canadian authority at the provincial, territorial, or federal
level.

The Application and Selection Process
Since 2015, foreign workers seeking a skilled visa to enter
and work in Canada have been required to apply through
the Express Entry system. The term “Express Entry”
refers both to Canada’s digital application management
system—an online database portal through which
candidates’ information is gathered, stored, processed,
and potentially matched with interested employers26—and
to the two-step selection process that Canadian officials
adopted in 2015. This new two-step selection process
consists of an “Expression of Interest” phase and an
“Invitation to Apply” phase, as illustrated in Figure 1.

Third, the Canadian Experience Class program is for
applicants who have at least one year of full-time
Canadian work experience within the last three years.
Applicants must also meet the minimum language levels
needed for their jobs.

Figure 1: Express Entry Canada Application Process
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In the first step, foreign workers seeking a skilled visa
begin by completing a candidate profile on the Express
Entry web portal. Once completed and submitted, this
profile is treated as an applicant’s “expression of interest”
(EOI). If the qualifications listed on a candidate’s profile
satisfy the minimum requirements of any of the three
federal skilled visa programs,27 the candidate’s profile is
then scored according to a points rubric called the
Comprehensive Ranking System (CRS).

foreign-born population in the world (with 60% of
foreign-born residents having a tertiary degree),31 and the
longest-standing and most elaborate points system in the
world. Indeed, Canada is consistently ranked as one of the
most desirable destination countries in the world. In a
recent Gallup World Poll on migration, over 47 million
potential migrants chose Canada as their top choice of
destination, making Canada the second-most-desired
destination country after the United States.32 This
attractiveness appears to be particularly strong among
skilled migrants, as suggested by a recent OECD study
examining the attractiveness of destination countries in
the eyes of highly qualified potential migrants.
Respondents ranked Canada as one of the top five
destination countries (alongside Australia, Sweden,
Switzerland, and New Zealand).33

Just as in Canada’s pre-2015 points system, the CRS
rubric assigns points to each candidate based on a range
of factors, including education or training, occupational
skills, occupational demand, age, fluency in English or
French, experience working or attending school in
Canada, and employer or provincial sponsorship. After
this initial review and scoring, profiles are placed into a
pool of eligible screened candidates.

Canada’s popularity as a destination state is a function of
several pull-factors. It has a highly developed and open
domestic economy, high safety and life expectancy rates,
and a stable and comparatively responsive political
system. It also has unusually high levels of domestic
support for immigration among both Canadian officials
and the Canadian population. This support may be driven
in part by demographic necessity, as Canada is expected
to face such large shortages of native-born workers in the
coming decades that immigrant workers will account for
all of Canada’s net labor force growth (3.7 million
workers) between 2018 and 2040.34 It is likely also the
result of a decades-long effort to incorporate
multiculturalism into the national ethos.35

The second phase of the application process occurs when
Canadian officials conduct a “drawing” or “selection
round.” In these drawings, conducted one or two times
per month, all candidates currently in the Express Entry
pool are ranked according to their CRS scores and the
highest ranking applicants are sent an “Invitation to
Apply,” allowing them to move on to the next step of the
application process. The number of invitations issued in
each drawing is determined according to monthly targets
set by the Ministry of Immigration, Refugees and
Citizenship. Candidates who have received these
invitations may28 then complete a full application, which
is reviewed by immigration officials according to the visa
program under which they are applying.29 Candidates
whose full applications are approved are then issued a
permanent residence visa.

In addition to these more general pull-factors, a recent
study suggests that Canada’s extraordinary success in
attracting skilled workers may be due in part to two key
aspects of its skilled immigration programs: the use of a
points-based selection system and the provision of a direct
route to permanent residence for skilled migrants.

§ 3 LESSONS FROM CANADA
Lesson 1: Canada has been remarkably successful
in attracting foreign workers in general, and in
attracting high-skilled foreign workers in
particular.

In a 2017 study examining the effectiveness of various
skill-selective migration policy designs, Czaika and
Parsons found that even when controlling for an
exhaustive list of economic, social, political, and other
factors, these two policy features were associated with
significant improvements in countries’ ability to attract
high-skilled foreign workers. On average, this study
found that countries that have established points-based
skilled visa programs attract approximately 1.5 times the
number of high-skilled migrants as countries that have

Canada has been and continues to be a leading destination
for foreign workers at all skill levels. It has the largest
permanent labor migration program among countries in
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD),30 the most highly educated
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not,36 and that skilled immigrants make up a larger share
of these countries’ overall labor migration flows.37 And
the decision to offer skilled visa programs that provide
immediate access to “permanency rights” Is associated
with even larger effects. Countries offering skilled visas
that grant permanency rights on arrival attract, on
average, two times the number of high-skilled migrants as
those that do not.38

heel of Canadian immigration, the share of highly skilled
foreign workers (that is, primary visa applicants admitted
through any one of Canada’s skilled visa programs) who
report finding employment within the first year of their
arrival in Canada has been steadily increasing since
2005.41 In 2016, the year that the Express Entry system
fully took effect, 86% of skilled workers admitted in the
prior year reported having found employment. 42 Data
gathered on subsequent cohorts of skilled foreign workers
selected through Express Entry show that this rate has
held largely steady at around 87%.43 In the medium- and
longer-term, outcomes for skilled immigrants in Canada
improve even further, with both employment rates and
average earnings increasing with duration of residence in
Canada. As of 2017, economic immigrants residing in
Canada for five or more years were 15 to 24% more likely
to be employed than Canadian natives, and their average
salary was 106% of the Canadian average.44

While there may be a number of possible explanations for
the remarkable effectiveness of these two policy design
elements, it is likely at least in part because points-based
selection systems and immediate permanency visas
reduce uncertainty costs for potential skilled migrants.
Points systems reduce uncertainty before applying,
allowing potential skilled migrants to estimate their
likelihood of being offered entry, by clearly listing all
selection criteria and their relative weights. (This reduced
uncertainty logic may be even stronger for countries that
employ two-step expression-of-interest systems, because
such systems’ ranking functions effectively move the
highest-scoring candidates to the front of the line,
minimizing the risk that the most qualified applicants will
not be offered visas due to quota limitations.39) Direct
permanent skilled visas reduce uncertainty after
admission by sparing admitted foreign workers many of
the costs they would have faced if granted only temporary
status, including the professional and personal costs of
being constrained in their ability to change employers, the
administrative and financial costs associated with
renewing or converting a temporary visa, and the
cognitive and emotional costs associated with being
uncertain about their ability to stay in their destination
country.40

These positive labor market outcomes for skilled foreign
workers have not been associated with any noticeable
negative effects on labor market outcomes for native-born
Canadians. Indeed, a number of studies have found that
skilled immigration has—and likely will continue to
have—a positive effect on Canada’s labor market and the
wider economy.45

Lesson 3: The longstanding success of Canada’s
points-based selection system would have been
impossible without its robust and comprehensive
data-gathering infrastructure.
Canada’s points system has been in place for more than
five decades. During this time, Canadian immigration
officials have made dozens of changes to the system’s
provisions and the processes, adjusting the system in
response to changing circumstances and emerging
challenges. For this ongoing process of policy adaptation
to be successful, policymakers needed to have access to
accurate, detailed, and reliable data on the characteristics
and outcomes of those admitted through the system. To
this end, Canada has built one of the most comprehensive
immigration data-gathering infrastructures in the world.

Lesson 2: Foreign workers admitted through
Canada’s skilled visa programs enjoy largely
positive economic outcomes and are generally
well-incorporated into the labor market.
According to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship
Canada (IRCC) and Statistics Canada—the country’s two
primary official sources of data on immigration flows and
immigrant outcomes—positive economic outcomes for
skilled immigrants living in Canada are generally quite
strong.

One core element of this immigration data infrastructure
is the Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB), an
administrative database containing data on every person
who has migrated to Canada since 1982. The IMDB
gathers and links information drawn from immigrants’

While short-term economic outcomes among newly
arrived skilled foreign workers were once the Achilles’
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“candidates who are most likely to succeed
economically.”52

admissions files with information drawn from the tax
returns they file in subsequent years. By incorporating
these two sources of data, the IMDB allows researchers to
examine not only patterns in the demographic and
professional characteristics of migrants admitted to
Canada through a given visa program but also trends in
those individuals’ socioeconomic outcomes in the years
after their arrival. This dataset is an invaluable resource
for immigration policymakers tasked with managing and
adjusting Canada’s points-tested skilled visa programs,
offering them a readily available source of information
about the relationships between candidates’ educational
and skill profiles and their short- and long-term economic
and social outcomes.46

As to the first objective, Express Entry has undoubtedly
increased the speed with which individuals’ applications
are processed. In 2014, the year before the launch of
Express Entry, the IRCC had a backlog of over half a
million unprocessed applications, and applicants faced
processing times of three to five years.53 Since 2015, the
IRCC has consistently processed 80% of skilled visa
applications in less than six months.54
This reduction in processing times is likely the result of a
number of changes implemented through the adoption of
the Express Entry system. One such change was the shift
from a “paper logic” to a “digital logic.” This involved a
comprehensive effort to redesign the way the IRCC
administered the points system, all but eliminating the
reliance on paper records and ushering in fully digital
application management, mass communication, and data
collection.55 Another change was the move from a onestep to a two-step application process. By automating the
initial round of reviewing candidates’ credentials and
allowing unselected EOI profiles to automatically exit the
pool at expiration, the two-step expression-of-interest
system alleviated much of the administrative burden
associated with reviewing applications.

Another element that contributes to the success of
Canada’s immigration data infrastructure is the existence
of the Evaluation Division, an agency within Canada’s
Ministry of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship
(IRCC). This Division is devoted entirely to monitoring
the functioning of Canada’s immigration programs,
including the integration of immigrants into the country’s
labor market and society. It also gives advice on needed
policy adjustments.47 Canada is one of only a few
countries to have a dedicated evaluation department
within its immigration ministry. 48
The IMDB database, research and evaluations published
by the IRCC’s Evaluation Department, and information
from various other sources (including the Express Entry
system itself)49 are gathered and stored through close
cooperation between IRCC and Statistics Canada, and are
made available to the public through Canada’s Open
Government Portal.50

As to the second objective, the Express Entry system does
in fact grant immigration policymakers more flexibility in
adjusting the points system’s criteria. Unlike the pre-2015
points table, the point values and criteria included in the
Comprehensive Ranking System points table are not set
by statute. Instead, the criteria and point values—along
with most other aspects of the Express Entry system—can
be changed through Ministerial Instructions, a tool of
administrative rulemaking that does not require
parliamentary review.56 While some have questioned
granting the Immigration Ministry this degree of
discretion, this change undoubtedly makes the
Comprehensive Ranking System points table a more
flexible and dynamic policy tool, capable of being
adjusted quickly to ensure that immigration targets are
being met and that those invited to apply for residency
have skills suited to the economy’s demands.

Lesson 4: Canada’s two-step Express Entry
application system is more efficient and responsive
than the prior one-step system, and may be more
effective at admitting candidates most likely to
succeed.
According to Canada’s IRCC, the Express Entry
application management system was designed with a
number of objectives in mind, including (1) increasing the
speed of application processing, (2) allowing the IRCC a
greater degree of flexibility in selection criteria and
application management,51 and (3) improving economic
and social outcome rates by accurately selecting those

As to the third objective, it is not yet possible to assess
whether candidates selected through the Express Entry
system have noticeably better integration outcomes using
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administrative data. Although the IMDB has been updated
to include candidates admitted in 2015, the current
version of the database does not include income
information beyond the 2015 tax cycle. Furthermore,
many of the applications processed between 2015 and
2017 were not submitted through the Express Entry
system but rather were part of the backlog of applications
submitted before 2015.57 Given this small sample size and
short time span, it is not yet possible to reliably assess the
comparative effectiveness of the Express Entry’s selection
mechanisms using the IMDB administrative data alone.

admitted through Express Entry may in fact perform
better on at least two metrics of economic outcomes. The
survey, distributed to foreign workers admitted between
2015 and 2018, compared the rates of employment and
median wages of those who applied through Express
Entry and those who had applied under the pre-2015
system. Twelve months after admission, 87% of those
who had applied through Express Entry had secured a job,
compared with 82% of pre-2015 system applicants.
Similarly, the candidates selected through Express Entry
had a higher mean and median income than the pre-2015
system applicants.58

That said, preliminary data from a survey conducted by
the IRCC in 2018 suggests that candidates selected and

These goals were central to the “white Canada” policy, a
racialized vision of nation-building prevalent in Canadian
politics from the late 19th century. See generally W. Peter Ward,
White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy
toward Orientals in British Columbia (Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2008).

See Alan G. Green and David Green, “The Goals of Canada’s
Immigration Policy: A Historical Perspective,” Canadian
Journal of Urban Research 13, no. 1 (2004): 117. (Describing
how, despite being instructed to assess candidates according to
their “training and skills,” immigration officials failed to give
frontline officers any clear guidance on which types of skills
were needed or how the officer was to judge whether the
applicant met the skill requirements.)
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Chapter 4:
Case Study—Australia’s Points-Based Immigration System
§ 1 THE EVOLUTION OF AUSTRALIA’S SKILLED
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM

Over the years, Australia revised its points system several
times. For example, in 1992 Australia introduced two new
visa classes, under which states and territories could
sponsor certain economic migrants. In 2007, Australia
revised the criteria for the subclass through which
students and holders of provisional temporary visas could
apply for permanent residence, placing greater emphasis
on language proficiency and relevant work experience.

In the early 1970s, the Australian government reoriented
the country’s immigration system away from simply
adding people toward economic nation-building. This
policy shift occurred partly because of economic
pressures. After the Second World War and through the
1960s and 1970s, the Australian economy grew rapidly,
putting increasing pressure on its domestic labor market.
Partly in response to growing labor market shortfalls,
Australian officials implemented a series of immigration
reforms aimed at increasing the inflow of qualified
foreign workers.1 This increase was accomplished partly
by raising caps on economic migration and partly by
removing immigration restrictions adopted under the
decades-old “White Australia”2 policy that had favored
migrants from the United Kingdom, the British
Commonwealth, and Europe. The decision to admit more
foreign workers, and to admit workers who hailed from
countries outside Europe and the British Commonwealth,
was controversial. But the policymakers behind these
changes ultimately swayed political and public support,
arguing that Australia’s economic future depended in
large part on its ability to “attract more highly skilled
workers, inventors, and entrepreneurs from Asia and
elsewhere.”3

In 2010, Australia shifted the focus of its skilled
migration stream away from “supply-driven” independent
skilled migration toward “demand-driven” migration, in
the form of employer and government-sponsored skilled
migration.6 The changes included establishing priority
processing arrangements under which applicants who had
received either government or employer sponsorship
would be processed before independent (non-sponsored)
candidates (an express change from the prior first-comefirst-served processing order), and phasing out existing
skills lists and replacing them with a skilled occupation
list to fill structural needs.7
In 2011, Australia revised its points test again to try to
end a years-long backlog (caused by slow application
processing and a first-come-first-served system under
which applicants who had submitted a complete
application were guaranteed consideration) and a
perceived inflexibility of program criteria.8 Among other
things, Australia created a two-step process for points
applications: First, applicants file an expression of interest
in immigrating to Australia. Then, if they pass a certain
score on the points test, they can file a formal
immigration application.

In 1973, Australian lawmakers changed the regulations
governing how immigration officers were to assess visa
applications, reducing their discretion and requiring them
to employ a merit-based qualitative assessment rubric.
This assessment rubric encompassed many of the same
factors as the then-newly implemented Canadian points
system. However, it stopped short of quantifying or
giving specific weighting guidelines for the various
factors to be considered. In 1979, Australia further
formalized its immigration selection guidelines, adopting
a points system that was similar to the Canadian points
system at the time.4 Australian officials allocated a
numerical weight to criteria such as age, education,
occupational skill, assessed capacity to adapt to
Australian values, and presence of family in Australia.5

§ 2 AUSTRALIA’S CURRENT SKILLED
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM
Australia’s current skilled immigration system is made up
of two federal-level points-tested visa programs.9 The
application and selection process for all three of these
programs is administered through the SkillSelect
application management system.

35

Australia’s Skilled Visa Programs

territory. Common criteria include having an occupation
listed on a state’s or territory’s own shortage occupation
list, having a job offer from an employer in that state or
territory, and agreeing to live and work within the
nominating state or territory for a period of time (usually
two or three years).13 Another notable difference between
these regional visas and the 189 visa is that candidates can
be eligible for these visas even if their occupation does
not appear on the Medium and Long-term Strategic Skills
List, so long as their occupation appears on the Short-term
Skilled Occupation List.

The first of Australia’s points-tested skilled visa programs
is the Skilled Independent visa (subclass 189). This visa
program is aimed at candidates who have the experience
and training needed to work in an occupation on
Australia’s Medium and Long-term Strategic Skills List.
The Skilled Independent visa program has generally been
the route through which most skilled immigrants entered
Australia, but in recent years it has been closely
followed—and in some years surpassed—by the
Employer Sponsored visa program.10 To be eligible for
the Skilled Independent visa program, a candidate must
be under 45 years old; meet certain health, character, and
English language requirements; meet a minimum score
(currently 65 out of 120) on a points test; and obtain a
successful migration skills assessment outcome in their
occupation.11

In addition to these two skills-based and points-tested visa
programs, Australia has a variety of other visa programs
that are either (a) aimed at selecting skilled workers but
are not points tested or (b) employ a points test but are not
aimed at selecting skilled workers. The former category
includes Australia’s Employer Sponsored permanent visa
programs: the Employer Nomination Scheme visa
(subclass 186) and the Regional Sponsored Migration
Scheme visa (subclass 187).14 Candidates for these visa
programs are not subjected to a points test, but they must
have a profession that appears on the Medium and Longterm Strategic Skills List.15 The latter category includes
certain parts (notably the Business Innovation stream and
the Investor stream) of the Business Innovation and
Investment (Provisional) visa (subclass 188) program.16

Australia’s second points-tested skilled visa program is
the State/Territory and Regional Nominated visa
subcategory. This program contains two visa
subcategories: the State/Territory and Regional
Nominated stream of the Skilled Nominated visa
(subclass 190) and the Skilled Regional visa (subclass
887). These visa programs are aimed at the same kinds of
skilled workers as the Skilled Independent (189) visa.

The 190 visa can be obtained without having held any
prior Australian visa, whereas the 887 is a dedicated
permanent visa avenue for individuals who have held
certain temporary or provisional visas for at least two
years. These visa programs are largely similar in structure
and eligibility requirements to the Independent Skilled
(189) visa described above.

The Application and Selection Process
Since 2012, foreign workers seeking an employmentbased visa to Australia must apply through the SkillSelect
system. This system employs an Expression of Interest
(EOI) model, in which the process of selecting foreign
workers includes two steps.

To be eligible for a 190 visa, a candidate must satisfy all
the same basic requirements as a 189 visa, including
being under 45 years old; meeting certain health,
character, and English language requirements; earning a
minimum score (currently 65 out of 120) on a points test;
and obtaining a successful migration skills assessment
outcome in their occupation.12 In addition to these
common requirements, candidates for a 190 visa must
also obtain a nomination from one of Australia’s states or
territories.

In the first step, foreign workers seeking a skilled visa
begin by completing a candidate profile on the SkillSelect
web portal.17 As part of their profile, candidates must
“nominate” a career for which they qualify. In this regard
Australia differs from Canada’s Express Entry system,
which does not allow candidates to select their chosen
visa programs and instead automatically sorts candidates
into visa programs according to qualification and
availability. By contrast, Australia’s SkillSelect system
requires candidates to select the visa programs for which
they would like to be considered. SkillSelect candidates
may select more than one visa program.

The criteria that applicants need to fulfill to receive a
nomination vary from state to state and territory to
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Once completed and submitted, this profile is treated as
an applicant’s expression of interest. Each candidate’s
profile is scored according to a points table that assigns
points based on a range of factors, including age, fluency
in English, educational qualifications, past study or work
in Australia, fluency in one of Australia’s community
languages, and the skills and qualifications of the
candidate’s partner or spouse (if applicable). If the
qualifications listed on a candidate’s profile satisfy the
minimum requirements of any of the visa programs they
listed on their EOI profile, that candidate’s profile is
placed into a “pool” of eligible screened candidates.

The number of invitations issued in each drawing is
determined according to monthly targets set by the
Department of Home Affairs. Candidates who have
received invitations may19 complete a full application,
which is then reviewed by immigration officials
according to the visa program under which they are
applying. Candidates whose full applications are
approved are then issued a permanent residence visa. The
process is illustrated in Figure 2.

The second phase of the application process occurs when
Australian officials conduct a “drawing” or “invitation
round.” In these drawings, all candidates currently in the
SkillSelect pool are ranked according to their point
scores. The highest-ranking applicants are sent an
“Invitation to Apply” (ITA). These invitation rounds are
conducted monthly. Only candidates who have received
an ITA can move on to the next step of the application
process.18

Figure 2: SkillSelect Australia Application Process
Candidate submits completed profile on
SkillSelect system ( administered by Australia's
Department of Home Affairs), stating their
occupation and designating which visa
subclass(es) for which they would like to be
considered.

Candidate profile
deemed invalid. May
apply again with new
profile.

Does candidate meet health, character,
debt and language requirements, and
old qualifications required to work in an
occupation on the Medium- and Long
Term Strategic Skills List (MLTSSL)?

Does candidate score at least 65 points
on the "SkillSelect" points rubric?

;---------------- -----,

Profile placed in
SkillSelect applicant
pool, ranked by points
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prior to submitting completed application
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Candidate's profile
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Immigration & Citizenship official reviews
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application (including all supporting .__ _ _ __;1111,,1 application according according to the visa
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(!TA)

Applicant not issued
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again at any time
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ls application
approved?
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Candidate is issued a
permanent residence
visa

Lesson 2: Foreign workers admitted through
Australia’s skilled visa programs enjoy largely
positive outcomes and are generally wellincorporated into the labor market.

§ 3 LESSONS FROM AUSTRALIA
Lesson 1: Australia has been remarkably successful
in attracting foreign talent.
Australia has welcomed and depended upon international
migration for many years. Over the last two decades, it
has become a leading destination for skilled foreign
workers. Between 2000 and 2010, the number of highly
skilled immigrants in Australia doubled, and that number
has only continued to grow since then.20 In a recent study
of the relative attractiveness of OECD countries among
highly qualified workers, Australia came in first, followed
closely by Sweden, Switzerland, New Zealand, and
Canada.21

Skilled migrants (that is, primary applicant migrants in
Skill Stream visas) in Australia demonstrate employment
outcomes that are similar to, and in some ways
significantly better than, those of the Australian general
population. According to survey data from Australia’s
Department of Home Affairs, the labor force participation
rate among permanent migrants admitted to Australia in
2017 at six months after their arrival was 88.4%, and their
unemployment rate was 7.0%.26 By contrast, the general
Australian labor force participation rate at the time was
64.7% and the unemployment rate was 5.7%.27

Australia’s popularity as a destination state is likely a
function of several pull-factors. As with Canada,
Australia has a highly developed and open domestic
economy, high safety and life expectancy rates, and a
stable and comparatively responsive political system. In
addition to these, it has a warm climate and a desirable
“national lifestyle.”22 And as with Canada, Australian
officials and the Australian public generally exhibit high
levels of support for immigration and immigrants, an
outgrowth perhaps of a similar decades-long effort to
embrace multiculturalism in Australian politics and
Australian education.23

These participation and employment outcomes were both
markedly improved when these same skilled migrants
were surveyed 18 months after arrival. At that point the
labor force participation rate of skilled migrants increased
to 94% and the unemployment rate fell to 2.8%. 28 At the
time of this second round of surveys, the labor force
participation and unemployment rates among the general
Australian population both held largely steady, with the
former increasing slightly to 65.5% and the latter
decreasing slightly to 5.5%.29

Notably, these positive labor market outcomes for skilled
foreign workers have not been associated with any
noticeable negative effects on the domestic labor market
or on labor market outcomes for native-born Australians.
A recent academic study concluded that there is “almost
no evidence” for the proposition that skilled immigration
negatively affects outcomes for native-born Australians,30
and an analysis by the Migration Council of Australia
concludes that skilled foreign workers have in fact had
significant positive effects on Australia’s labor market
and the wider economy, with few appreciable negative
effects on employment outcomes for native Australians.31

In addition to these more general pull-factors, Australia’s
success in attracting skilled workers may also be due in
part to two key aspects of its skilled immigration
programs: the use of a points-based selection system and
the provision of a direct route to permanent residence for
skilled migrants. In their 2017 study, discussed in more
detail in the Canada chapter, Czaika and Parsons found
that countries that operate points-based skilled visa
programs attract an average of 1.5 times the number of
high-skilled migrants as countries that lack such
programs.24 Moreover, countries that offer skilled visa
programs that provide immediate access to “permanency
rights” attract, on average, 2 times the number of highskilled migrants as countries that do not.25

Lesson 3: Australia is a model of how points-based
skilled visa programs can complement employersponsored visa programs.
As discussed in more detail in the U.S. chapter, we
propose that the United States establish a points-based
visa program, not as a replacement for its existing
employer-driven green card programs but in addition to
38

them. We chose this policy proposal partly for practical
reasons. Adopting a points system by adding a new visa
track would be comparatively less costly, both politically
and economically, than overhauling the United States’
existing economic visa infrastructure. But we also chose
this policy design because, by operating both a pointstested independent skilled visa program as well as
continuing existing economic visa streams, the United
States could reap the benefits of both. The existing
employer-driven visa programs will ensure that the shortrun needs of the U.S. labor market are met, while the
points-tested independent visa program will help to
address the longer-term needs of the U.S. human capital
infrastructure.

their rates of employment and over-qualification converge
with their employer-sponsored peers as their duration of
stay extends past three to four years; and they command
higher salaries than employer-sponsored visa holders in
the long run.35

Lesson 4: Australia’s robust and consistent datacollection programs have been vital to the
successful management of its points-based visa
programs.
Australia has offered points-based skilled visas for more
than four decades. Over this time, as discussed earlier in
this chapter, Australian officials have made various
adjustments to the weighting and categories addressed in
the points table itself, the form and content of the
occupation lists used in the application process, and the
number and provisions of the specific visa programs to
which the points test has been applied. Each of these
adjustments was made according to changes in the
economic or political climate within and outside
Australia, or perceived malfunctions of the points system
itself.36 The success of policymakers’ efforts to continue
to adapt Australia’s points system to new and emerging
challenges depends on their having access to accurate,
detailed, and reliable data on the characteristics and
outcomes of those admitted through the visa programs
that use this points system. To this end, Australian
immigration officials have built up an impressive array of
performance monitoring and data-gathering tools.

Australia provides a useful real-world test of this
proposition because, unlike Canada, Australia currently
operates its employer sponsorship as a separate stream
alongside the rest of its skill stream visas. Prospective
foreign workers wishing to apply for one of Australia’s
two employer sponsored visa programs—the Employer
Nomination Scheme (ENS, subclass 186) and the
Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS, subclass
187)—are not subject to a points test, and they apply
through a different online system that is separate from
SkillSelect.32
The move toward dividing Australia’s supply-anddemand-driven economic visa streams began with reforms
announced in February 2010, explicitly reworking the
skilled independent visa programs to meet medium- to
long-term skill needs while allowing the employersponsored visa programs to address more immediate
needs.33

One of these tools is the Continuous Survey of Australia's
Migrants (CSAM).37 Created in 2009 and administered by
the Department of Home Affairs, this survey program
examines the labor market outcomes (and other settlement
and integration outcomes) of recently arrived permanent
migrants in Australia. The CSAM surveys migrants
arriving through both Skill stream and Family stream visa
programs, gathering data on economic outcomes—as well
as a variety of individual characteristics that may be
relevant to labor market outcomes (such as gender,
education level, age, and English language ability)—for
both primary and secondary applicant migrants (e.g.,
accompanying family members).38 To gather both static
outcome data and data showing the changes in outcomes
over time, the CSAM consists of two survey rounds: an
introductory survey issued to migrants six months after
their arrival in Australia (also referred to as “the six-

Data on the economic outcomes of foreign workers
admitted to Australia through these two streams suggests
that operating both demand- and supply-driven visa
streams has resulted in a pool of foreign workers with
largely complementary traits. Migrants entering Australia
through an employer-sponsored visa program tend, on the
one hand, to have higher rates of short-term employment,
lower levels of mobility, and lower levels of skills
mismatch than those who entered via a skilled
independent visa. On the other hand, they also tend to be
older, less educated, and less diverse in their gender and
countries of origin.34 Independent skilled migrants tend to
have poorer employment rates in the short term. However,
they tend to be higher skilled and have higher mobility;
39

month stage of settlement”) and a second follow-up
survey issued 18 months after arrival (the “18-month
stage of settlement”).39

economic migration,43 reduce backlogs by improving
administrative efficiency,44 and attract the “best and
brightest intending migrants” from around the world. 45

In addition to the survey-based outcome data gathered by
the CSAM, there are at least three major sources of
information on immigration outcomes that are based on
administrative data. The first of these is the SkillSelect
system itself. Given its design as a fully digital
application management system, SkillSelect data records
information on the characteristics of candidates
submitting EOI profiles, those selected to receive
invitations to apply, and those whose applications were
ultimately processed.40 The other two are the Personal
Income Tax and Migrants Integrated Dataset (PITMID)
and the Australian Census and Migrants Integrated
Dataset (ACMID). These two datasets were created by the
Australian Bureau of Statistics in 2013 and 2016,
respectively. PITMID contains information on recent
permanent and provisional migrant taxpayers’ personal
income generated by linking the Australian Taxation
Office Personal Income Tax records with migrant records
from the Australian Government’s Settlement Database.41
ACMID provides information about the location,
household characteristics, and other residence
characteristics of permanent migrants in Australia
generated by linking Australian Census data with
Permanent Migrant Settlement Data gathered by the
Department of Home Affairs.42

SkillSelect has accomplished all three objectives. First,
the two-stage EOI application process has given
immigration officials a greater degree of control over the
rate and composition of economic immigration controls.
This was accomplished partly because, under the twostage EOI application system, immigration officials set
the number of invitations to apply issued in each draw,
allowing them to adjust the pipeline of visa applications
awaiting processing at any one time according to the
needs of the Australian job market and the processing
capacity of the immigration officers tasked with
reviewing visa applications.46 It was also partly
accomplished through reforms passed alongside
SkillSelect that give the Department greater capacity to
adjust the parameters of Skill Stream visa programs
without seeking parliamentary approval.47

Second, the SkillSelect system has reduced application
backlogs and processing times. Indeed, there was not only
a sharp decrease in processing time that occurred between
the old system and the adoption of SkillSelect, but
processing times have continued to fall since then, with
average processing times falling sharply over the period
in which SkillSelect has been operating.48
These improvements in application processing times,
along with the ranking function of the two-step EOI
system, have both contributed to the third objective. The
highest-scoring candidates are more likely to receive
invitations to apply and are likely to receive these
invitations sooner than those with lower points, making it
more likely that these candidates will be admitted.49 And,
once they apply, because they will find out more quickly
about the outcome of their applications, these highly
desirable candidates are less likely to have received jobs
or migration offers elsewhere.50

Lesson 5: Australia’s two-step SkillSelect
application system and reforms implemented at
the same time have improved efficiency, reduced
costs, and lowered burdens on applicants.
When the Australian government rolled out the
SkillSelect application system in 2012, their stated
objectives were largely similar to those set by Canadian
officials when launching their Express Entry program
three years later. The SkillSelect system would, in the
words of Australia’s then-Department of Immigration and
Citizenship (succeeded by the Department of Immigration
and Border Protection), offer Australian officials a greater
degree of control over the rates and composition of
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Chapter 5:
Recommendations for the United States
§ 1 CURRENT U.S. EMPLOYMENT-BASED
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM

or asylees), and about 4% are issued through the diversity
visa program. See Figure 3 below.

The United States has the largest immigration system in
the world. Each year, more than 10 million people enter
the United States on temporary visas, and about 1 million
people receive permanent residence visas, also known as
green cards. These overall immigration flows are divided
roughly into four streams: family, economic or
employment-based, humanitarian, and the diversity visa
program.

In the United States’ current economic immigration
stream, about 140,000 permanent visas are available each
year. These are allocated across five employment-based
categories (formally known as “preferences”). The
employment-based first preference category (EB-1) is for
people with extraordinary ability, as well as outstanding
professors and researchers, and certain executives and
managers. EB-2 is for people who have advanced degrees.
EB-3 is for other professionals, as well as skilled and
unskilled workers. EB-4 is for certain miscellaneous
workers, such as religious ministers. EB-5 is for certain
immigrant investors. The 140,000 total includes both
principal workers and their spouses and children. Most
employment-based immigrants must have an employer to
sponsor them. Most of the time, an employer who seeks to

Although the totals vary from year to year, about 65% of
the permanent visas issued by the United States each year
are issued to migrants entering through a familysponsored visa, about 12% are issued to economic or
employment-based migrants, about 15% are issued to
those entering for humanitarian reasons (e.g., as refugees

Figure 3: Proportion of Green Cards Issued Each Year by Visa Stream (Values based on category averages
from 2015-2018)
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hire a foreign worker permanently must first obtain a
certification from the Department of Labor stating that
there is no U.S. worker who is qualified and available for
the same position. The employer must also prove that
hiring the foreign worker will not affect the wages and
working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers.
This is known as the labor certification process.

from source to source, but they generally include
questions of scale and government structure.
While Canada and Australia are similar to the United
States in many ways, including shared cultural roots, legal
traditions, and economic orientations, they also differ in
important ways. For example, Canada and Australia are
significantly smaller than the United States in terms of
population, economic output, and yearly immigration
flows. Given these significant differences, we don’t have
confidence that simply importing a Canadian or
Australian points system to the United States would work.

The current employment-based immigration system in the
United States, whether temporary or permanent, selects
for the short-term, specific labor needs of certain
employers, not the long-term human capital needs of the
United States.

The governmental structure in the United States also
differs significantly from that in Australia and Canada.
Australia and Canada have parliamentary systems that
have delegated much immigration responsibility,
including making changes to their points systems, to their
immigration ministries. Congress cannot move quickly
enough to provide the sustained and responsive tinkering
necessary for a points program to function effectively.

§ 2 GOALS OF PROPOSED POINTS-BASED PILOT
PROGRAM
Pressure Relief: Providing Additional Capacity for
High-Skilled Immigration Without Changing
Existing Skilled Visa Programs
As noted in the first chapter of this report, the United
States’ current immigration system is failing U.S.
employers and the country in a variety of ways. These
failures are likely to become more serious in the near
future, as the U.S. economy undergoes significant
changes in the face of challenges like the COVID-19
pandemic, automation, an aging workforce, and growing
skills “mismatches” across sectors and geographic
regions.1

For these reasons, we propose a low-cost, low-risk path.
Because our immigration points program would be
implemented as a small pilot program, questions
regarding the feasibility of a points program here in the
United States could be explored in a real-world setting,
and could be addressed in a staged manner. And the
question of whether a points program could be
successfully scaled up to manage all employment-based
immigration to the United States could be postponed for
at least ten years. By then empirical evidence will help
answer that question.

Although there is ample evidence suggesting that even a
moderate increase in skilled immigration would benefit
the country,2 for 30 years the U.S. Congress has failed to
reform the employment-based green card categories. By
providing an alternate avenue for 50,000 skilled workers
to enter each year, our proposal presents a way to relieve
pressure on existing visa programs without changing
current categories.

Filling a Policy Gap: Providing for Long-Term
Economic and Social Needs of the United States

Proof of Concept: Providing a Low-Cost, Low-Risk
Path to Testing the Efficacy of an Immigration
Points Program in the United States

The United States’ existing employment-based visa
programs—both temporary and permanent—are generally
oriented toward meeting the short-term needs of U.S.
employers. These programs are designed to select those
candidates that fulfill an immediate need of a U.S.
employer that it cannot fulfill otherwise due to a gap in
the U.S. labor market.3

As detailed in prior chapters, the data have shown how
immigration points programs benefit Canada and
Australia. However, we cannot adopt their models
wholesale. The reasons given for this uncertainty vary

There are two problems with relying on the labor
certification system as the primary means of selecting
economic immigrants. First, the interests of U.S.
employers are not identical to the interests of the United
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§ 3 DETAILS OF PROPOSED PROGRAM

States as a nation-state or of its residents as a collective
polity. Second, the elected lawmakers charged with
setting U.S. immigration policy have a fiduciary duty to
provide not only for the short-term needs of particular
companies, and the nation’s economy and labor market,
but also for the country’s long-term economic success and
health. The labor certification system is structurally illsuited to address either problem. There is, therefore, a gap
in U.S. immigration policy.

Selection Criteria and Point Values/Weights
Because the capacity to and likelihood of making these
future contributions cannot be measured directly, our
program—like all other immigration points programs—
instead selects candidates based on a series of
characteristics that are indirectly correlated with the
likelihood of economic success and social integration of
foreign workers.

Establishing a modest points-based selection program
would allow lawmakers to fill this gap. Because the
selection criteria of points-based programs are set by
government officials, these programs can be adjusted over
time to accommodate the evolving needs and interests of
the state and the public interest, not just to fill jobs. And
because their criteria for selection include factors other
than employer sponsorship or a job offer, policymakers
can use points programs to select candidates for
permanent immigration with the kinds of skills,
experience, and capabilities that they believe will
contribute to the country’s long-term success.

Moreover, because our pilot program is meant to augment
and not to replace the current U.S. employment-based
immigration program, and given that the structure of the
current labor certification and employer sponsorship
program leads to the selection of foreign workers on the
basis of short-term need, we have designed our points
rubric (Table 1)—both in the selection of criteria and in
the weights allocated to each—to select for individuals
most likely to contribute to the success of the United
States in the longer term.
In reviewing this points rubric, the reader should also
notice another design choice: that of the scale and range
of the possible points values. With any numerically scaled
assessment, the choice of numerical scale is somewhat
arbitrary. But in making a selection of which scale to use,
one should aim for a scale that is both intuitively
understandable and a range that is wide enough to
accommodate fine distinctions and adjustments. With
these guidelines in mind, we chose to set our maximum
possible points value at 1,000. This maximum is a factor
of ten, making scores calculated in relation to that
maximum more easily understood at an intuitive level.
Although 100 may be an even more intuitive total, and
one we could have used given that all our current points
allocations are reducible by a factor of ten, we opted for
the larger 1,000-point maximum to give future lawmakers
the ability to make finer adjustments and distinctions
among factors in future revisions.

Moreover, by establishing this points program alongside
the existing labor certification system, U.S. policymakers
will be able to fill this gap while allowing each of these
programs to remain tailored to their respective goals. The
existing labor certification programs need not be altered
to consider longer-term economic goals or interests
beyond those of domestic employers, and the points
program need not include factors whose inclusion is
driven by questions of short-term employability.
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Table 1: Points Table (or “Rubric”) for Proposed Pilot Program
Factors

Education

Max.
Points

Weight (as
% of Max.
Possible
Total)

Points Allocation Guidelines

Highest Degree
Earned

200

20%

Doctorate: 200 points
Master’s: 150 points
Bachelor’s: 100 points

U.S.-Based Degree
Bonus:

50

5%

>1 postsecondary degree earned from U.S.
institution: 50 points

100

10%

18 - 29 years of age: 100 points
30 years of age: 95 points
31 years of age: 90 points
32 years of age: 85 points
33 years of age: 80 points
34 years of age: 75 points
35 years of age: 70 points
36 years of age: 65 points
37 years of age: 60 points
38 years of age: 55 points
39 years of age: 50 points
40 years of age: 45 points
41 years of age: 35 points
42 years of age: 25 points
43 years of age: 15 points
44 years of age: 5 points
>45 years of age: 0 points

English Language
Proficiency

100

10%

Superior English: 100 points
Proficient English: 80 points
Competent English: 60 points

Other Language
Proficiency

50

5%

Superior 2nd Language: 50 points
Proficient 2nd Language: 40 points
Competent 2nd Language: 30 points

Employment
Experience

150

15%

> 8 years: 150 points
5-8 years: 100 points
3-5 years: 50 points
< 3 years: 0 points

Employment
Experience within
U.S. Bonus:

50

5%

Currently employed in a skilled occupation by
U.S.-based employer OR > 2 years’ experience
working in a skilled occupation for a U.S.-based
employer: 50 points

U.S. Resident
Spouse/Partner or
First-Degree
Relative

100

10%

Has a spouse/partner or first-degree relative U.S.
citizen or permanent resident: 100 points

Age

Language
Proficiency

Employability

Family Support
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Demographic
Characteristics

Accompanying
Spouse/Partner or
First-Degree
Relative

100

10%

Will be accompanied by spouse/partner or firstdegree relative when moving to U.S.: 100 points

Country of Origin
Bonus

50

5%

Is a national of a state designated a “developing
country” by USAID: 50 points.

Gender Bonus

50

5%

Is non-male: 50 points

1000
TOTAL POSSIBLE

Education

factor. Candidates who are between 18 and 29 years old
when they begin the application process will be allocated
the full 100 points. For each additional year of age
beyond 29, a candidate will receive 5 fewer points. For
example, a 30-year-old candidate will receive 95 points, a
31-year-old candidate will receive 90, and so on. Per this
declining pattern, candidates aged 45 years or older will
receive 0 points for this factor. Children under 18 receive
no points.

The first human capital factor we include is education.
This factor contains two potential sources of points. The
first is based on an applicant’s formal educational
attainment, with applicants being granted 100, 150, or 200
points according the highest post-secondary degree they
attained. These points allocations are not additive, but
rather given based on the highest post-secondary degree
awarded. An applicant who has received both a bachelor’s
degree and a master’s degree, for example, would receive
150 points. 1

We have allocated age a significant number of points in
our proposed points rubric for several reasons. Research
suggests that immigrants’ age at time of admission is a
significant predictive factor in the likelihood and degree
to which they will successfully integrate into the social
and economic fabric of their new home state.3 The
allocation of points in this factor is arranged as a simple
linear decline by age cohort because arriving in a host
country at a younger age brings various benefits. The
younger an individual is at the time of their arrival, the
more flexible they tend to be in adapting to new economic
and cultural surroundings.4 Younger immigrants will also,
on average, have greater positive fiscal effects because
they have more working years ahead of them in which to
pay taxes and more years until they draw on any public
retirement funds. And for foreign workers whose native
language is not English, flexibility and having a longer
time horizon have some impact on language acquisition.
Research suggests that immigration at an older age is
associated with lower fluency in English, while English
proficiency tends to improve the longer a foreign worker
lives in an Anglophone host country.5

This factor is the most heavily weighted in our points
rubric because education is both a key predictor of
employability and a strong indicator of the kinds of
positive psychological characteristics and pro-social soft
skills, like adaptability and resilience, that help to foster
long-term success.2
The second potential source of points under this factor is a
small bonus of 50 points for an applicant who holds at
least one post-secondary degree from a U.S.-based
institution. We include this for two reasons: First, foreign
workers who have attended college in the United States
will likely have an easier time acclimating to the U.S.
labor market. Second, it is in the interest of the federal
government, both fiscally and in terms of global soft
power, to encourage foreign students to attend U.S.
colleges.

Age
The second human capital factor we include is age.
Candidates can be allocated up to 100 points for this
48

While these positive correlations justify favoring younger
applicants, we opted to allocate the maximum number of
points to a wide age range—between 18 and 29—and thus
to set the threshold for declining points at 30. We have a
few reasons for extending this favored age window over a
decade into adulthood. Given that our proposed points
program is aimed at highly skilled foreign workers, our
points distribution for this factor should account for the
time that it takes to earn one or more post-secondary
degrees and/or accumulate skilled work experience.
Further, even in their late 20s, the average candidate’s
cognitive and social flexibility will have yet to decline
significantly, and they will still have three or more
decades of professional life ahead of them.

increasing job opportunities and facilitating social and
political participation.8
While awarding points on the basis of English fluency has
been controversial in past points program proposals in the
United States, we believe it is still a worthwhile selection
criteria because of its robust positive value. Whether this
correlation is due to linguistic or cultural biases of hostcountry employers or to less nefarious causes, it is real
and measurable.
That said, we acknowledge the structural biases that
rewarding English proficiency brings with it, and the
limitations of any measure of linguistic fluency.9 And
while it would be impossible to perfectly counterbalance
those biases and limitations, we aim to reduce their effects
in two ways: by (1) offering multiple ways of proving
English fluency and (2) granting points for the degree of
fluency in an applicant’s native language.

Language Proficiency
The third human capital factor we include is linguistic
proficiency. This factor contains two potential sources of
points. We allocate 100 points according to an applicant’s
degree of fluency in English and an additional 50 points
according to their demonstrated proficiency in a language
other than English.

Proficiency in a language other than English

In addition to earning points for their degree of fluency in
English, applicants may also earn points for their degree
of fluency in one other language, including their own.
While allocating points based on fluency in a language
other than English may seem counterintuitive, it is not
unprecedented among countries with points-tested
immigration streams.10 Rewarding applicants’ fluency in
languages other than English will help to foster the
creation of a culturally and linguistically diverse work
force, an outcome that is vital to a variety of compelling
U.S. interests.

Proficiency in English
We include a measure of English language proficiency
among our points categories not out of a belief in the
inherent importance of English or a nationalist pride in
the language, but rather because fluency in a host
country’s majority language has been found to be an
important predictor of both short-term economic success
and long-term social integration. Also, the United States
is heavily reliant on English for many functions and those
who are not proficient in English may have a harder time
adapting. In the short term, foreign workers’ fluency in
the prevailing language of their host state strongly
influences their likely economic outcomes, not least of
which is their ability to find and maintain skilled
employment.6 In addition to influencing the likelihood of
workforce participation, linguistic fluency has also been
shown to be strongly related to the pay foreign workers
can command in the job market. Recent studies have
found that foreign workers who are highly fluent in their
host country’s majority language may receive up to 20%
or, in some cases, up to 35%, higher salaries than their
less-fluent counterparts.7 In the longer term, fluency in the
prevailing host state language is vital to foreign workers’
economic and societal integration, improving and

In the economic sphere, the capacity of the United States
to maintain its economic standing depends on the ability
of U.S. firms to compete in a globalized market. The
ability to fluently communicate with potential trade
partners or colleagues abroad in their native tongues,
while also being intimately familiar with cultural
differences or pitfalls, is a vital form of human capital that
could significantly influence the success or failure of a
given worker’s firm. Within firms and working teams,
cultural diversity may generate new ideas or new
perspectives on existing problems, as people from
different backgrounds may see solutions, problems, or
connections that those from other backgrounds may not.11
And having team members fluent in a variety of
languages and cultures can help companies design brands
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and messaging that will be clearly understood by foreign
audiences and avoid embarrassing “brand blunders”
caused by translation mistakes or unintended meanings.12
Indeed, it has now become common practice among
transnational companies to conduct “cultural-linguistic
checks” on any new brands or marketing before they are
released in a new market. These checks are expensive,
requiring surveys of native speakers or consultations with
specialized professional linguists—or hiring PR firms to
perform these tasks. Having the ability to hire employees
and team members with personal experience and language
skill gained from living and working in a target market
can allow companies to defray some of this cost by
bringing this cross-cultural expertise in-house. This added
value of linguistic and cultural fluency can be seen in
studies of both U.S. and European job markets, with
workers who have mastery of a foreign language earning
up to three percent more than their monolingual
counterparts.13

program and the likely demographics of the candidates
that would pass through it—is the Test of English for
International Communication (TOEIC). This assessment
consists of two separate exams: the TOEIC Speaking and
Writing Test and the TOEIC Listening and Reading Test.
This assessment is both comprehensive enough and
specific enough to provide a reliable indication of how
well a candidate will be able to understand and
communicate in English on the job. In examining all four
dimensions of language fluency (reading, listening,
writing, and speaking), it provides a multi-faceted
assessment of English ability and fine-grained feedback
for the candidate regarding specific skills they could
improve. And the assessment materials themselves are
tailored to the work environment, requiring subjects to
perform common workplace tasks, including taking part
in a conversation about sales and reading Englishlanguage manuals and technical materials.
The TOEIC is also established and reliable. Over 14,000
organizations across 160 countries currently use the
TOEIC to assess current employees’ English fluency, to
assess potential new employees, and to track the progress
of employees in English-language usage.18

In the political and strategic arenas, fostering linguistic
and cultural diversity among U.S. residents is similarly
vital for U.S. national security and its capacity to project
hard and soft power abroad. Recognizing this strategic
need, the Defense Department has emphasized expertise
in critical languages in its recruiting programs. Despite
this, the U.S. military and intelligence services have
struggled to find sufficient numbers of U.S. nationals with
expertise in these languages.14 To address this, the
Defense Department has invested heavily in language
training facilities for U.S. servicemembers.15 Moreover, in
2008, Congress established the Military Accessions Vital
to the National Interest (MAVNI)—a program designed
to allow noncitizens with specialized language skills to
enlist in the U.S. military.16 While these investments and
programmatic changes have improved the language skills
shortfall, there is still unmet demand for additional native
or fluent speakers of various mission-critical languages.

Measuring fluency in languages other than English
Widely accepted exams of language proficiency already
exist for many of the most commonly spoken languages
in the world. For example, the American Council on the
Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL) has established
versions of their Assessment of Performance toward
Proficiency in Languages (AAPPL) exam—a fluency test
that measures reading, writing, listening, and speaking
skills—that can measure fluency in Arabic, Chinese,
French, German, Korean, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish,
Hindi, Italian, Japanese, and Thai.19 Like the TOEIC, the
AAPPL exam assesses all four dimensions of language
fluency.20

Finally, it makes sense to reward candidates’ fluency in
their own native language because having high levels of
fluency in one language may predict a broader capacity
for language acquisition, thereby acting as an indicator of
likely English proficiency in the future.17

The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center
(DLIFLC) has developed tests for some less-commonly
spoken languages.21 The rating scales and scoring
methods of any of these exams could be standardized
using any of a number of existing scales designed to
compare fluency evaluations across languages, including
the Interagency Language Roundtable proficiency scale,22
the Common European Framework of Reference for
Languages,23 and the ACTFL proficiency scale.24 All of

Measuring fluency in English
While various tests exist to test English fluency, the most
appropriate one—given both the goals of our proposed
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these would be promising standards by which to
standardize and compare knowledge of a second or third
language for immigration purposes.

The second potential source of points under this factor is a
bonus of 50 points for applicants who are currently
employed by a U.S.-based employer in a skilled
occupation or who have had at least two years’ experience
working for a U.S.-based employer in a skilled
occupation. The term “skilled occupation” employed in
the criteria for this small points category will also be
defined as an occupation requiring a four-year degree or
equivalent.

Alternative methods of establishing fluency
Whatever metric or evidence of fluency ends up being
adopted, the task of proving one’s fluency—in English or
any other language—should not be made overly
burdensome for either applicants or the immigration
officials tasked with evaluating them. To this end, we
propose that applicants seeking to prove their fluency in
English or a second language should be allowed to do so
either by taking a standardized language proficiency test
or by presenting evidence that they have completed at
least a three-year college degree in which the language
being asserted was the principal language of instruction.

We include this bonus for two reasons. First, by deciding
to employ a prospective foreign worker, a U.S.-based
employer implicitly endorses that candidate’s credentials
and the value of their human capital. Second, candidates
with current employment in the United States or with an
offer of employment upon their arrival have already
surpassed one of the major hurdles in economic and social
integration.

Employability

Family Support

The fourth human capital factor we include is
employability. This factor contains two potential sources
of points. The first is based on the number of years of
experience in a skilled occupation. For purposes of this
program, we define “skilled occupation” as used in the
current H-1B visa program, meaning an occupation
requiring at least a four-year degree or its equivalent.
Applicants with more than eight years of experience in a
skilled occupation will receive the maximum 150 points
allocated to this factor. Applicants with between five and
eight years’ experience will receive 100 points, those with
between three and five years’ experience will receive 50
points, and candidates with fewer than three years’
experience in a skilled occupation will receive 0 points
for this factor.

The fifth human capital factor we include is family
support. This factor contains two potential sources of
points. Candidates who have a spouse or an adult firstdegree relative who is already residing in the United
States as a citizen or lawful permanent resident will be
granted 100 points. (The term “first-degree relative”
denotes an individual’s parent, sibling, or adult child.)
Candidates who, if selected for admission, will be
accompanied by a spouse or one or more first-degree
relatives will be granted 100 points. These two
subcategories are additive, meaning that candidates who
satisfy both of these stated criteria will receive 200 points.

We include these two measures of direct family support in
our points rubric because having a personal support
network is a key predictor of an individual’s long-term
economic integration and personal well-being, and
because family units are culturally important in the United
States. While personal support networks are not limited to
family members, candidates who will have a spouse or
close family member with them in the United States will
arrive with the foundations of a support network already
in place. Having a partner or close relative nearby can act
as a bulwark against social isolation and can provide a
source of much-needed psychological, emotional, and
practical support. The presence of a partner or close
family member should be seen as a form of human capital
because it can foster stability and bolster a foreign

This factor is the second most heavily weighted factor in
our points rubric, for two reasons: First, experienced
workers generally make a more immediate contribution to
their employer and to the broader economy than do less
experienced workers. And experienced workers bring
with them more intellectual capital, in the form of best
practices and professional networks, than do less
experienced workers. Second, building up years of
sustained employment in a skilled profession requires at
least some degree of the same psychological
characteristics and social soft skills as those required to
complete a post-secondary education.
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Development (USAID)’s list of “developing countries”30
will be granted 50 points. In the latter subcategory, female
candidates will be granted 50 points. These two
subcategories are additive, meaning that candidates who
satisfy both criteria will receive 100 points.

worker’s capacity to weather both the challenges and
setbacks that accompany moving to the United States and
adapting to a new social and work environment, and the
longer-term aspects of human life that we all face.25
In addition to the ways in which including family
supports as a factor in our points rubric might lead to
better integration outcomes for the foreign workers
selected under this program, including these kinds of
family-friendly considerations in the program’s selection
criteria may make the United States a more attractive
destination for skilled foreign workers choosing between
potential destination states. In the words of researchers
Harriet Duleep and Mark Regets, “highly educated
immigrants have families too.”26 As such, in designing
skilled immigration policies, we should remember that in
deciding where to bring their talents and earning capacity,
skilled foreign workers report weighing family concerns
just as much as, if not more heavily than, factors like
salary or professional advancement.27

We include these demographic factors because although
contemporary points-based immigration systems that
select candidates based on training and skills are more
transparent and unbiased than prior systems, they are still
prone to some degree of inequality and imbalance.
Indeed, even when systems are facially neutral regarding
the gender, race, or national origin of applicants, these
systems can still lead to significantly disparate outcomes
for women or those from lower-income nations. Women
remain significantly underrepresented in both the
applicant pools and admitted cohorts in highly skilled visa
programs in countries throughout the OECD.31 And these
same systems are consistently more likely to admit
individuals from richer countries than from poorer ones. 32

Adopting policies that incentivize skilled foreign workers
to bring their families with them when coming to the
United States will also result in longer-term benefits.
Broadly speaking, the children of parents with high levels
of human capital tend to attain high levels of human
capital themselves.28 This tendency is well-documented
and has been attributed to a number of different potential
causal factors. Leaving aside the thorny issue of genetic
or inherited capacity, much of the correlation between
high levels of education in parents and higher rates of
education in children can be attributed to socioeconomic
and cultural factors. Highly educated parents may have
more financial resources to devote to their children’s
education. And even in the absence of this financial
advantage, these parents can pass on non-monetary
intellectual capital—the cultural and practical
understanding of academic culture—that will help their
children navigate educational institutions.29

Some degree of this disparity has been linked to specific
design elements common to many skilled immigration
programs, such as the use of a “shortage occupation list”33
or defining “skilled employment experience” according to
salary earned.34 For these and other reasons, when
designing our points program, we have opted not to
include these policy elements.
That said, however, we acknowledge that our points
program cannot fully avoid these problems of structural
advantage and disparate outcomes. Any program that
selects candidates based on human capital will contain
structural biases, because not every potential applicant has
equal access to the opportunities, resources, and
institutions necessary to accumulate human capital. In
many countries around the world, women do not have
equal access to education or skilled employment, whether
due to formal exclusion or cultural gender-based
expectations.35 Similarly, because of marked differences
in educational institutions and size of skilled economic
sectors across states, applicants from developing countries
may face significant obstacles to gaining a degree from a
globally recognized institution or finding skilled
employment opportunities in their home countries.36 In
addition to these problems of unequal access, many
scholars have argued that the inclusion of seemingly
neutral factors like a candidate’s age37 or even the focus
on “skilled” immigration itself may have the effect of

Demographic Characteristics
The sixth and final factor we include is intended to offset
some of the structural advantages falling to certain types
of candidates that plague any purportedly meritocratic
selection system. Under this factor, a small number of
points will be allocated according to a candidate’s country
of origin and gender. In the former subcategory, nationals
of a state currently on the U.S. Agency for International
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creating “winners and losers along these lines of
identity.”38

a relatively small pilot program, so there is no need to
spread the administrative or logistical burden across
agencies. Additionally, dividing administrative authority
over this program among agencies would introduce
unnecessary overlap, barriers, and transaction costs that
would make the program less efficient and flexible. We
believe that the agency most suited to manage the pilot
program currently is U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS).

It is important to address and counteract these kinds of
structural issues to the extent possible, partly for reasons
of fairness and partly to be consistent with the United
States’ longstanding commitment to non-discrimination in
both its domestic law and international agreements.
Beyond these normative justifications, there are also
strategic and utilitarian reasons to address disparities tied
to gender and national origin. As discussed in the section
above addressing the points allocated on the basis of
language proficiency, there is significant economic and
competitive value to fostering diversity in the workforce,
at both the company and national levels. Thus, any skillsbased visa selection program that disproportionately
selects affluent males from developed countries would
hurt U.S.-based firms, the U.S. economy, and the United
States as a global leader in innovation and trade.

Regardless of which agency is granted responsibility over
this program, that agency will need to work with other
agencies that oversee related government issues. If
Congress selects USCIS to operate the pilot program, for
example, it would still need to liaise with other
government agencies, such as the Department of Labor.
Specifically, the Department of Labor should be granted
the authority to compile lists of occupations to be
classified as “highly skilled” for the purposes of the pilot
program, to compile lists of occupations and job
categories in which there are existing labor shortages, and
to design the methodology employed in both of these
tasks.

For all these reasons, we include in our proposal two
points bonuses that are meant to at least partially
counteract the structural disadvantages that women and
nationals of developing countries often face when
attempting to build their human capital. This policy
design tool—bonuses based on demographics—is
admittedly a blunt solution to a set of nuanced problems.
But it is a step in the right direction.

This cooperation and consultation would also have to
extend to Congress. While implementation and
operational responsibilities would be delegated to USCIS,
that agency should not be granted unfettered authority to
make changes to the pilot program. While the details of
this division of authority would be worked out in the
legislative drafting process, it could look something like
the following. In addition to responsibilities related to
regular operation of the pilot program, Congress might
grant USCIS officials a degree of leeway in making small
operational changes (e.g., adjusting points thresholds for
each monthly draw according to trends in the candidate
pool, setting and adjusting tiebreaker rules, adjusting
points table category allocations by 10-15%). If USCIS
wants to make any changes that would exceed this limited
operational discretion, USCIS officials may propose those
changes and they would need to be approved by an
appropriate legislative gatekeeping body. We propose
limiting this legislative review to the chairs and ranking
members of immigration subcommittees, a majority of the
members of the Senate and House immigration
subcommittees, or some similar set immigration
stakeholders and experts in the legislative branch.

Procedural Elements
Administrative and Oversight Authority/Jurisdiction
If the pilot program and related proposals presented in
this report gain sufficient political support among U.S.
lawmakers, that process would have to begin in Congress.
We recommend that this implementing legislation be
introduced and passed through Congress as a standalone
bill, rather than as part of a comprehensive immigration
reform package. We discuss this strategy in more detail
later in this chapter.
Once enacted, the responsibility to implement and operate
the pilot program would pass to the executive branch.
Although authority over various aspects of U.S.
immigration is currently divided among several executive
agencies, we recommend granting operational authority
over the pilot program to a single administrative agency.
We make this recommendation on the grounds that this is
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Granting the administrative agency overseeing the pilot
program a limited degree of authority to make changes
may be seen as going against the prevailing wisdom in the
policy literature. Others argue that for a points program to
succeed, it must be “actively managed” by policymakers
capable of adjusting the parameters of their points
programs (the “attributes and points awarded”) when
necessary to account for “changing economic and labormarket policy priorities” and to respond to problems or
inconsistencies revealed by ongoing policy evaluations
(such as “longitudinal data on selected immigrants’
economic outcomes”).39 We agree that the pilot program
should be actively managed, and that it must be flexible
enough to allow for adjustment over time. However,
unlike the Canadian and Australian points systems on
which these experts base this recommendation, the pilot
program laid out in this report is designed to focus on
selecting individuals who will help to build the United
States’ long-term human capital infrastructure, not on
short-term labor market needs. Thus, given that there is
no need for the officials tasked with operating the pilot
program to adapt to a fast-changing labor market, we
believe our pilot program can be successfully managed
and adjusted over time, as needed, by administrative
officials without requiring the wholesale discretion
granted to immigration officials in the Australian and
Canadian systems.

high-quality applicants and more able to produce timely
and predictable results.

Data Collection and Evaluation
Our pilot program is designed to establish an immigration
stream dedicated to selecting individuals who have the
capacity to contribute to the long-term economic growth
and overall societal health of the United States. Although
we believe that our proposed program will succeed in this
goal, all forecasts are fallible and the program’s
parameters and procedures will need to be adjusted and
fine-tuned. To make these kinds of changes,
administrators and oversight bodies must have access to
detailed and reliable information about the employment,
economic, and societal outcomes of foreign workers
admitted through this program.
To this end, we propose that the administrative agency
overseeing the pilot program be required to gather data on
the economic and social outcomes of candidates selected
through the program. Data points that would need to be
gathered include:
• High-level data about the operation of the pilot
program, such as the number of candidates selected for
entry through the pilot program each year, the
parameters for each periodic draw from the candidate
pool, the number of invitations to apply issued versus
the number of applications actually submitted, and the
rate of acceptance among applicants.

Under our recommended division of authority outlined
above, this program would be sufficiently flexible to
allow administrative officials to address minor issues of
adjustment that might arise during implementation or the
normal operation of this program without legislative
consultation. This discretion would ensure that necessary
adjustments can be made to keep this program
operational. On the other hand, although limiting the
authority of administrators to make significant changes
may reduce the program’s flexibility, such limitations
foster another quality commonly associated with points
programs: transparency. By limiting the ease with which
major changes can be made to the structure of our pilot
program, our proposed division of authority encourages
stability in program requirements over time. This stability
would help to ensure that prospective immigrants,
employers, and any other actors involved in the
application process understand and can rely on the
program’s rules, making the program more attractive to

• Demographic data on candidates’ birthplace/nativity,
age, educational qualifications, proposed occupations,
and time spent in the United States before application
or admission. These data points should be gathered and
retained for all candidates who submit an expression of
interest and are placed in the EOI pool. These data
should allow for comparisons between the makeup of
the overall EOI pool and the subsets of candidates
invited to apply and those ultimately admitted.
• Outcome data on admitted foreign workers, including
their workforce participation, what occupation they
came to work in after admission to the United States,
their geographic destinations, and the degree to which
their actual employment matches their educational
qualifications and past experience.
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• Outcome data on various non-economic dimensions of
integration, including social, civic and cultural
aspects.40

be de-identified and anonymized as much as possible. To
reduce the risk that individual records could be “reidentified,” the data storage protocols could employ
privacy protection techniques such as deleting personally
identifiable information, masked data-sharing (employing
techniques such as list inflation, third-party linkage, or
grouped linkage), or making fully linked data available
only through secure data centers where researchers are
permitted to analyze the data under controlled
conditions.42

The administrative agency tasked with implementing our
pilot program could gather most of these operational and
demographic data points by retaining and organizing
internal administrative data generated by the EOI
application management system. To generate reliable data
on outcomes, however, the agency would need to conduct
staged surveys of foreign workers admitted through this
program.

Standing Advisory Board

These surveys could be modeled on the Continuous
Survey of Australia's Migrants (CSAM) or Canada’s
Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC).
These large-scale, longitudinal surveys, described in the
case study chapters above, ask questions about
employment and integration of a sample of each incoming
foreign worker cohort. Both surveys employ a staged
survey strategy that involves issuing surveys to a selected
sample in waves, with respondents being issued surveys
at—for example—6 months, 18 months, and 42 months
after arrival.

In addition to having access to comprehensive and
reliable data, administrators and lawmakers charged with
overseeing our pilot program should also have ready
access to expert advice on how to interpret the data, what
policy changes could be made, and the effects that any
such changes might have. We therefore recommend that
Congress create a standing advisory board consisting of a
variety of stakeholders in immigration policy, including
policy experts in the economics, sociology, and public
policy effects of immigration; civil servants with
experience in administering the United States’ and/or
other countries’ immigration systems; and representatives
from professional associations, labor unions, and industry
trade associations.43

To ensure that the data gathered by the agency running
our pilot program are useful in assessing and reassessing
the elements of the program, we recommend that the
survey and administrative data be linked and stored to
allow researchers to disaggregate individuals according to
demographic characteristics and conduct fine-grained
comparisons of outcomes across different subgroups.
Additionally, if possible, these data should link to data
drawn from Census Bureau–administered surveys,
including the decennial census and the American
Community Survey.41

This advisory commission should be established as an
independent, non-partisan body to provide objective,
evidence-based, professional advice and analysis to
lawmakers and administrators. While the mandate of this
commission could be limited to matters relating
specifically to our pilot program, we recommend that the
commission have a wider purview, allowing them to issue
recommendations about any policy issues relating to U.S.
immigration as a whole. This advisory board should be
empowered to address issues or questions raised by
lawmakers or administrators, and to issue advisory reports
sua sponte.

This dataset would be available, of course, to internal
researchers working for the overseeing administrative
agency. But the data should, as much as possible, also be
made available to outside evaluators (e.g., external
agencies, firms, or academics) and the public.

Establishing this independent source of advice and
analysis would provide at least two significant benefits:
First, it would establish a uniform channel through which
lawmakers and administrators, regardless of their political
alignment, could seek advice that might help them avoid
making policy changes that would have unintended and
undesirable downstream effects. Second, being able to
seek out evidence-based recommendations from an

Because this dataset would involve record linkage,
participants in the EOI pool and respondents to any
subsequent surveys would need to give their consent to be
included in the dataset. To protect the privacy of those
candidates and admitted foreign workers whose
information is included, the individual-level data should
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independent panel may provide some degree of political
separation for lawmakers and administrators, allowing
policy reviews or adjustments to be cast more as
technocratic exercises than as sites of partisan conflict.

§ 4 EXPLANATIONS OF DESIGN CHOICES

While the United States currently lacks a standing
commission on immigration, various analogous advisory
bodies exist elsewhere in the federal government. For
example, when debating monetary or trade policy,
Congress and the executive branch rely—both for
technical and political reasons—on research and
recommendations made by the Federal Reserve Board and
the International Trade Commission. And there exists
significant support, among both current members of
Congress44 and advocates and experts in the broader
immigration policy landscape,45 for the creation of a
similarly nonpartisan advisory commission to support
policymaking in the area of immigration.

Reworking the entire economic stream of the U.S.
immigration system from one that is entirely employerdriven to one that is government- and supply-driven
would be a massive undertaking and would require a great
deal of political capital and agreement. By contrast,
creating a relatively small pilot program would require
much less effort and political capital.

Why Implement Our Program as a Pilot and Not a
Permanent New Visa Track?

Furthermore, although this kind of selection system has
been well-tested elsewhere in countries that share many
characteristics with the United States, this does not mean
that this system can be “imported” wholesale or that it
will have the same outcomes and effects that it has in our
case study nations. Thus, testing out this kind of selection
system through a small pilot program would generate
valuable data regarding outcomes and effects in the U.S.
context and allow U.S. policy makers who support scaling
up this kind of program to fine-tune and address
"teething" issues before a larger-scale roll-out.

Periodic Review Process
To ensure that lawmakers and administrators charged
with overseeing the pilot program have access to data and
advice and put these resources to use, the legislation
implementing this program should include requirements
and procedural guidelines for periodic reviews of this
program’s effectiveness and efficiency. These periodic
reviews would require the administrative agency running
the pilot program to prepare and submit a report for
Congressional oversight every two years. These reports
would provide an overall assessment of the functioning of
the program based on compilations and analyses of
available administrative and survey data, as well as
proposals for any revisions or adjustments that
administration officials believe are required to improve
the operation or outcomes of the program.

Why a Single Application Stream?
The points-based selection systems established in Canada
and Australia are used to manage multiple visa programs
or visa subcategories. We believe that the points-based
program we propose in this report could be adapted
relatively easily to accommodate multiple visa streams
should lawmakers decide to do so.

For the purposes of this proposal, though, we opted to
keep our focus narrow, laying out a program aimed only
at high-skilled foreign workers. In the interest of
simplicity and clarity, we refrained from being too
expansive in the goals addressed or fine-grained in the
distinctions made.

Building in a requirement for regular reviews, as well as
specific standards and guidelines that should be
employed, has a number of advantages. Among other
things, it would act as a structural reminder of the
provisional and experimental nature of the pilot program.
By requiring lawmakers and administrators to regularly
ask questions about the effectiveness of this program and
to think about ways In which the program’s elements
could be adjusted or corrected, this built-in review
process makes it more likely that this program will in fact
be improved over time through a process of iterative
reform.

If this program proves successful enough that lawmakers
would like to expand it, the next step we recommend
would be the addition of a stream aimed at mediumskilled workers in foreign trades.
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Why Allocate Permanent Visas Rather Than
Temporary/Provisional Visas?

same size as the current diversity visa lottery. By adopting
this scale, patterning the size of our program on an
already existing small visa program, we aim to make our
proposed program large enough to be a reliable proof of
concept but also small enough to be politically feasible.

Among countries that employ points-based immigrant
selection systems and have updated their skilled
immigration policies in recent years, there has been a
trend toward an increased use of temporary or provisional
visas. This trend represents a departure from the norm.
Traditionally, points programs have been employed to
allocate permanent employment visas. The evidence from
these earlier points programs suggest that, in the long
term, individuals with the kinds of human capital
characteristics we will be selecting for tend to exhibit
high levels of employment, attain high salaries over their
career, and thus tend to contribute to their host countries’
labor markets and tax revenues. Given the depth of this
evidence, and our resultant confidence that the kinds of
highly educated, well-qualified individuals our program
will select for will contribute to the economic and societal
good of the United States, there is no particular need to
place administrative hurdles in front of them.

Why Employ a Points-Based Selection Mechanism?
Points-based selection mechanisms have long been lauded
by immigration policy experts for their effectiveness and
efficiency. Additionally, these systems have a series of
procedural advantages, “streamlining the immigration
process and yielding transparent, objective, and flexible
criteria for selecting skilled immigrants.”47

Why Adopt an “Expression of Interest” Application
System?
As explained above, we recommend that our pilot
program be managed using a two-step expression of
interest (EOI) system like those used in Canada and
Australia. We have a number of reasons for making this
recommendation. Two-step EOI systems process
applications more efficiently and quickly, reduce
administrative burdens on immigration officials and
applicants, and reduce the likelihood of application
processing backlogs.

We opted to follow this older pattern and design our pilot
program around a set of 50,000 permanent visas for a
number of reasons. First, because our program focuses on
selecting individuals who can contribute to the long-term
success of the United States, employing temporary or
provisional visas would make little sense. Second, we
believe there is no compelling reason to impose the
additional cost and uncertainty that come with provisional
or two-step visa programs on the high-skilled foreign
workers selected under our program. By contrast, by
sparing these foreign workers this unnecessary
administrative burden and offering them long-term
stability, we free their time and attention and allow them
to get on with making their contributions to the United
States and embedding themselves in our society. Third,
from the perspective of the global race for talent, the offer
of permanent residence in the United States without
needing to attain any provisional or temporary visa
beforehand would be a significant “pull factor” that would
make the United States that much more attractive
compared to our global competition.46

After adopting their EOI systems, the average processing
times for immigration applicants in both Canada and
Australia dropped markedly. Currently, successful
immigration candidates can expect to have their
applications processed in less than six months. That
marks a significant improvement over the years-long
processing times such applicants had to endure under both
countries’ previous systems.48 Administrators for these
programs have been able to achieve these processing
times partly by adjusting the size and frequency of draws,
calibrating the volume of applications to be examined to
match the current processing capacity of immigration
officers.
Administrative burdens are further lowered under EOI
systems as compared to older one-step application
systems because any EOI profiles that have not been
selected before the set profile expiration date are
automatically deleted. This automatic clearing function
serves to relieve immigration officers of the
administrative burdens that would have been associated

Why 50,000 Green Cards?
In deciding on the scale of our proposed points program,
we recommend 50,000 green cards annually largely
because this would make our pilot program roughly the
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with processing applications from candidates that would
ultimately be rejected as underqualified.

Second, although this fractious political atmosphere may
make it effectively impossible to build a broad enough
coalition of support to pass a comprehensive immigration
package, we believe that it may be possible to cobble
together sufficient support to pass certain narrow reforms
that address issues in a way that can be supported by
groups and ideological positions across the political
spectrum. This is also an issue on which the American
public broadly agrees. Roughly eight in ten U.S. adults
surveyed in a January 2019 Pew Research Center poll
supported policies that “encourag[e] highly skilled people
to immigrate and work in the U.S.”53 This support is
consistent with results from other polls conducted over
the last decade showing substantial public approval for
increasing high-skilled immigration to the United States.54

In considering whether to adopt an EOI system or the
older one-step selection system, U.S. policymakers should
treat Canada’s and Australia’s decision to adopt EOI
systems, and to maintain them in the years since, as
significant evidence in favor of selecting such a system.
In both countries, transitioning to an EOI system from the
older one-step selection systems involved revamping or
retrofitting existing systems, and so entailed massive
economic, political, and logistical costs associated with
designing and implementing a new application system;
retraining immigration personnel; and widespread
litigation from current applicants. The fact that both states
opted to bear these costs and go ahead with the transition
to an EOI system suggests that they believed that the
efficiency, flexibility, and cost benefits of this newer
approach were worth it. Given that the United States does
not have an existing points system that would need to be
revamped or adapted, it could reap the “benefits of
backwardness”49—benefitting from the costly experiences
of its peer countries without incurring any of the
innovation or retrofitting costs that those countries had to
pay.

Third, we believe that getting something done is better
than getting nothing done. Furthermore, we believe that
the act of passing any immigration reforms, however
narrow or incremental, might help to break the legislative
logjam and lay the political and strategic foundations for
further improvement.
Fourth, we believe that enacting reforms that specifically
address skilled immigration could be a particularly useful
first step in the process of overall immigration reform.
Based on survey evidence collected in Canada and the
United States, we believe that an increase in high-skilled
immigration could help to change the perception among
U.S. citizens toward immigration generally. Repeated
surveys of the Canadian and Australian electorate’s views
on immigration show higher levels of support for
immigration, and that this positive evaluation of
immigration is due in large part to the large proportion of
immigration to those countries that is dedicated to highskilled employment-based immigration. Based on this
evidence, we believe that enacting a standalone piece of
legislation that not only admits 50,000 additional skilled,
trained and educated foreign workers into the United
States but does so using a transparent and open selection
process would be a useful step toward changing domestic
attitudes about immigration.

§ 5 EXPLANATION OF
POLITICAL/STRATEGIC CHOICES
Why Advocate for a Standalone Bill?
We recommend that Congress implement our pilot
program in a standalone piece of legislation for several
reasons:
First, we believe that in the current atmosphere of
political polarization and legislative gridlock,
comprehensive immigration reform seems less likely than
ever.50 The rocky reception to the 2019 RAISE Act bill
indicates that the parties are even further from a
negotiated compromise than they were in 2013, when the
Senate passed a comprehensive immigration reform bill 51
that died in the House.52
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